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1 
Abstract	  	  
A growing body of theoretical literature suggests that banks have a target capital structure.1 
This idea is supported by the empirical findings that it exists a large cross sectional variation 
in regulatory capital ratios and that these ratios often are well above the minimum 
requirements. Rationalized by a simple cost-benefit analysis, the literature suggests that 
profit-maximising banks choose a target capital ratio to which they actively adjust over some 
time period.  
This master thesis examines the regulatory capital adjustments of Norwegian banks over the 
period 1993q1 to 2013q1. Firstly, we analyse the factors contributing to banks’ unobservable 
target capital ratios and the speed at which banks adjust their capital structure. Secondly, we 
investigate how these adjustments are performed.        
We find evidence for capital optimization in terms of the Tier 1 capital ratio. A notable 
finding is that Norwegian banks face substantial costs of adjusting their capital ratios. On 
average, Norwegian banks close only 4.1 percent of the gap between their effective capital 
ratio and target each quarter. Cost of adjusting capital may therefore be an important 
explanation why they hold capital ratios above the regulatory minimum.  Banks’ target capital 
ratio is shown to decrease with bank size. On the other hand, an increase in earnings capacity 
and managers’ perception of risk is shown to increase target capital ratios.  
Adjustments towards target capital ratios have significant impact on both assets and capital. 
Our result indicates that Norwegian banks prefer to fine-tune their risk-weighted assets 
instead of making real changes to the size of their balance sheet when being away from their 
target capital ratio. Furthermore, we find that banks are more likely to increase their capital 
levels when they are below their target capital ratios, than they are to decrease it when they 
are above.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 See e.g. Berlin (2011), Berger et al. (2008) or Memmel & Raupach (2010). 
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1.	  Introduction	  and	  Motivation	  
It is well known that the capital structure of banks differ from that of non-financial firms in a 
number of dimensions. Due to their important role as financial intermediaries, banks have the 
ability to finance themselves with customer deposits. These deposits are generally insured by 
deposit guarantee schemes. Some banks have also gained an implicit guarantee of their debt. 
This may induce them to hold low capital levels. Moreover, banks’ approach to managing 
their capital ratios can have important macroeconomic effects. As emphasised by Adrian and 
Shin (2010), a negative shock to banks’ capital ratios can lead to downward shifts in credit 
supply, resulting in procyclical effects of bank capital management. Banks are therefore 
subject to regulatory capital requirements.  
But banks’ balance sheets displays capital ratios in excess of the regulatory minimum. This 
does not necessarily mean that they are not capital-constrained at all. Banks are very likely to 
hold a voluntary buffer over the regulatory minimum requirement in order to reduce the 
likelihood of supervisory intervention or the need to raise capital on short notice. Moreover, 
market participants may constrain banks to hold an institution-specific cushion over the 
regulatory capital level (Lindquist, 2003; Stolz & Wedow, 2005). A growing body of 
literature therefore suggests that banks chose a target capital ratio to balance the benefits and 
costs of increasing their capital level (Berlin, 2011; Memmel & Raupach, 2010). The process 
of capital adjustments towards this target can have important policy implications and should 
be closely monitored. Banks that have enough regulatory capital may nonetheless have large 
deviations from their optimal capital targets, which can potentially induce large fluctuations in 
credit supply.  
The present master thesis seeks to analyse the following questions: First, what factors 
determine banks’ internal target capital ratios? Second, how do deviations from these target 
capital ratios influence banks’ actions in terms of adjustments in their capital and asset 
position?        
In a first step, a partial adjustment model is developed in order to estimate the factors 
contributing to banks’ target capital ratios. This step is justified by theory and empirical 
evidence supporting the idea that banks face capital adjustment costs that preclude them from 
achieving their desired levels immediately (Berrospide & Edge, 2010; Francis & Osborne, 
2009b). Banks try to converge towards an implicit target while maximising their profit. We 
focus on the Tier 1 capital ratio and estimate banks’ implicit targets as well as the speed of 
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adjustment at which they move towards these targets by using observables from bank balance 
sheets. The model is estimated on a panel of Norwegian banks over the period 1993q1 to 
2013q1. The partial adjustment framework also allows us to compute the deviation between 
each banks effective and target capital ratio in each period.  
In a second step, we investigate how these deviations influence banks capital decisions. 
Deviations from target capital ratios are likely to be reflected in adjustments to banks’ balance 
sheets. For instance, when banks experience a capital shortfall relative to their target, they can 
increase the numerator of the capital ratio by issuing new equity or retaining earnings. 
Alternatively, they can reduce the denominator by slowing down their overall lending growth 
or seek to reduce their risk-weighted assets by replacing riskier loans with safer ones. By 
estimating the impact of banks’ target capital ratio deviations on the growth in different 
capital and asset items, we are able to assess how banks perform their adjustments towards 
their targets.  
The master thesis is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss banks choice of 
capital structure and the capital adjustment process from a theoretical point of view. In section 
3 we discuss the basic considerations for bank regulations and present a review of the 
regulatory frameworks over the period of analysis. In section 4 we extend the discussion on 
bank capital structure and present a model on banks total adjustments costs. We review 
relevant literature in section 5 and describe the data in section 6. In section 7 we present and 
describe the partial adjustment model, and the models of growth in different capital and asset 
items on a banks balance sheet. In section 8 we discuss econometric methodology and its 
applications to our dataset. We display and discuss descriptive statistics and results in section 
9. Section 10 summarizes and provides some concluding remarks.     
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2.	  Bank	  Capital	  Structure	  and	  Adjustment	  Decisions	  
The problem of how firms choose and adjust their capital structure has brought a great deal of 
attention from corporate financial economists and has been an intense source of debate. In a 
banking context, the outset of such debate is, among other issues, the question of the 
relevance of a bank’s equity ratio for its total funding costs. This section provides a 
theoretical background for this question and discusses factors that might affect the ongoing 
costs of holding equity on a bank’s balance sheet. It also discusses how market frictions are 
likely to affect the costs associated with raising new external equity, and how banks’ choices 
among various strategies for adjustments in equity ratios can have macroeconomic outcomes.  
2.1	  Does	  Capital	  Structure	  Matter?	  	  
Financial firms generally hold less capital than non-financial firms. Spokespersons for the 
banking industry often assert that a higher reliance on equity will increase banks’ funding 
costs, simply because equity holders require a higher return than debt holders, or equity is 
more expensive than debt. However, by itself this assertion has no sound basis in corporate 
finance (Vale, 2011).       
One of the most important insights regarding capital structure is the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) irrelevance theorem, henceforth MM. It states that the total value of a firm is 
independent of its capital structure, i.e. of the composition of its liability side. This implies 
also that the total funding costs of the firm are independent of its liability structure, or in our 
context that a bank’s total financing costs are independent of its equity ratio. The essence of 
MM`s result is that the required return on equity depends on the equity ratio. Higher equity 
ratio implies lower volatility of the equity. Since rational pricing implies that a less-risky 
financial claim commands a lower risk premium, it follows that the required return on equity 
will fall. In addition, more equity relative to debt means that the debt becomes safer and also 
requires a lower return. Even if equity always is riskier than debt, MM´s result implies that 
the effect of the lower risk premiums is just enough to offset the increased weight on the more 
expensive equity, so that the weighted average funding costs remains constant2.  
However, MM critically depends on a set of ideal and stringent conditions – they include, for 
instance, no distortionary taxes, symmetric information and no transaction costs.  Deviations 
from these conditions are likely to affect banks as well as non-financial firms.  
                                                
2 This result is mathematically expressed in appendix A.1 
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2.1.1	  Effects	  of	  Debt	  Guarantee	  	  	  	  	  
A special feature of banks is an explicit and implicit guarantee of banks’ debt. The existence 
of such a guarantee implies that bank owners do not have to compensate creditors fully for the 
risk of the debt. Consequently, the bank may have access to relatively cheap debt funding and 
can reduce its total funding costs by substituting equity with debt.   
The explicit part of the guarantee is a deposit insurance, implemented in order to protect 
depositors in full, or in part, from losses caused by a bank’s inability to pay its debt when due. 
The Norwegian Banks Guarantee Fund cover deposits in all banks with a head office in 
Norway up to a total amount of two million Norwegian kroner (Bankenes Sikringsfond, 
2013). The implicit part stems from governments’ inclinations to save a bank in distress rather 
than letting the bank fail. Crises in large and interconnected banks usually occur when the 
economy is in or heading into a recession. Closures of such banks will enhance the economic 
downturn and is thus something governments will try to avoid. Several banking crises have 
therefore been resolved by giving banks considered “too big to fail” direct government 
support. During Norway’s banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990s, government capital 
was injected into failed banks and the existing share capital was written down. In cases where 
the losses exceeded the existing share capital, the entire capital was written down to zero so 
that no creditors suffered losses. As creditors might expect the same type of policy response 
from the government in the future, large banks have gained an implicit guarantee for all its 
debt (Moe & Vale, 2012).   
With the debt guarantee in place, creditors do not have full incentives to monitor the bank and 
may not require an adequate risk-adjusted return. The banks have thus access to relatively 
cheap debt funding as long as the guarantor does not require the bank to pay an actuarially fair 
premium for the guarantee. If the bank either pays a zero premium for the guarantee or a flat 
premium independent of risk, the guarantee can be considered a subsidy to the banks’ owners. 
Merton (1977) shows that the value of this subsidy can be considered a put option. The value 
of this put option increases with the level of guaranteed debt and the volatility in total assets. 
Hence, if a bank either pays a zero or a flat premium, higher debt will increase the value of 
the subsidy. The existence of such a subsidy might therefore be one reason why bank owners 
usually prefer low equity ratios in banks (Vale, 2011). 
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2.1.2	  Effects	  of	  Taxes	  and	  Asymmetric	  Information	  	  
Having established that the existence of debt guarantees might cause bank owners to have a 
preference for low equity ratios rather than high equity ratios, one cannot rule out that other 
factors might also affect banks’ preferences for a special capital structure. The tax treatment 
of debt and asymmetric information has implications for the validity of MM.  
As for all firms, interest paid by banks on debt is tax-deductible, while dividend payments on 
equity are not. This feature of the taxation system reduces the cost of debt relative to equity.  
Other things being equal, a bank can therefore reduce its funding costs by issuing more debt. 
However, there are different opinions on the tax benefit of debt. In order to determine the 
actual value of the tax benefit a bank must take into account the taxes at the investor level. 
Differences in the tax rate on interest income and capital gains from equity have the potential 
to offset some of the tax advantage from debt. In particular, if the interest income is taxed 
more heavily than capital gains from equity, the value of the actual tax benefit is reduced 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). This does not, however, apply for the Norwegian taxation system. 
The dividend taxation, introduced in 2006, implies that capital is taxed more heavily than 
debt. The Norwegian taxation system does consequently favour debt (Bøhren, 2013).  
In addition to the tax treatment of debt, asymmetric information may cause bank owners to 
have preferences for high debt ratios rather than high equity ratios. Asymmetric information 
occurs when one party has more and better information than the other party. Informational 
asymmetries may be especially severe in banks and cause agency problems. The 
management’s information on strategy and operational activities is likely to be superior of that 
of the owners. Regulations make it difficult to own more than ten percent of a bank, which 
means that the distance between ownership and daily control may be large in banks (NOU 
2012:2).  Moreover, banks’ assets are highly liquid and therefore readily marketable. This 
means that bank owners are better served with high debt ratios. The reason for this is that 
creditors might be more effective in imposing discipline on bank owners. Small and 
uncoordinated owners are ineffective in putting pressure on managers to generate cash flows 
(Bøhren, 2013).  
2.1.3	  Effects	  of	  Costs	  Associated	  With	  Bankruptcy	  and	  Financial	  Distress	  
The existence of a debt guarantee, distortionary taxes and asymmetric information may be 
reasons why bank owners usually prefer low equity ratios. However, not everything about 
banks points towards debt. Costs associated with bankruptcy and financial distress occur 
 
 
9 
when a bank is expected to have difficulty in meeting its debt obligations and increase as the 
equity ratio declines. Theories like the “trade-off” theory therefore suggest that a bank must 
balance the benefits and costs of increasing debt level (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011).  
Expected costs of financial distress and bankruptcy are likely to be especially high in the 
banking industry since it is a highly leveraged industry. The sale of bank loans are, for 
example, expected to happen at a lower price than the fundamental value because the buyers 
are less-informed about the quality of the loans. Also, the administrative costs related to 
bankruptcy are substantial for a bank. However, due to the effects of the debt guarantee, bank 
owners bear a smaller share of the expected financial distress and bankruptcy costs compared 
to other industries (Finanstilsynet, 2011).    
2.2	  Capital	  Adjustments	  	  
In the preceding subsections we have considered factors that make equity capital more 
expensive to banks than debt finance on an ongoing basis, no matter how the equity comes to 
be on the balance sheet. Information asymmetries may affect the way banks choose to raise 
equity or make adjustments to its equity ratios. As pointed out by Kashyap, Stein and Hanson 
(2010), a bank may be reluctant to raise equity in the market.   
A bank that seeks to increase its equity ratio has a number of options available. One set of 
strategies relates to the numerator of the equity ratio. A bank can increase the numerator by 
issuing new equity in the market or accumulate equity over time via retained earnings. Issuing 
equity in the market is likely to be the less-attractive option because the bank can often 
become subject to frictions in that market. New share issues tend to reduce the market value 
of the existing bank owners’ shares. Myers and Majluf (1984) provide a theoretical 
explanation for this phenomenon. The management’s information about the true value of a 
firm is likely to be superior of that of outside investors. If the management acts on behalf of 
the existing shareholders, then a choice to issue new shares will often be interpreted as a 
negative signal by outside investors. This is because the management will be more inclined to 
issue new shares in the market when the firm is currently overvalued as opposed to 
undervalued. There is a typical “lemons problem” in the equity market.3 Outside investors 
                                                
3 Akerlof (1970) uses the market for used cars as an example of quality uncertainty. Lemon is a slang term for a 
car that is found to be defective only after it is bought. 
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consider the firm is overvalued and are willing to pay less. Hence, the firm`s shares have to be 
sold at a discount in the issuance.4  
This reasoning implies that the existing bank owners often will have a preference for 
increasing equity through retained earnings rather than through issuing new equity. In order to 
accumulate equity via retained earnings, the bank can seek to decrease the share of profits it 
pays out in dividend or alternatively boost the profits itself. A way to do so is to increase the 
spread between the interest rate it charges on loans and the interest rate it pays on its funding. 
Competitive pressures can make it difficult for one single bank to widen these spreads, but the 
lending spreads could rise across the system if all banks followed a similar strategy.     
Reducing overall expenses would also increase the bank’s net income (Cohen, 2013). 
Hence, the costs specifically associated with issuing new equity in the market can be avoided 
by an appropriate time period that allows banks to gradually accumulate equity through 
retained earnings. However, a bank that finds itself in an under- or overleveraged situation 
may also prefer a second set of strategies that involves changes to the asset side of the bank’s 
balance sheet, i.e. the denominator of the capital ratio. The bank can run down on its loan 
portfolio, or sell other assets, in order to raise its equity ratio. Furthermore, the bank can seek 
to reduce its risk-weighted assets, i.e. the denominator of the bank’s regulatory equity ratio. 
Banks are allowed to hold different levels of equity for various assets, based on those 
particular assets’ risk characteristics. Hence, by replacing riskier loans with safer ones, the 
bank can reduce its risk-weighted assets and consequently increase its regulatory equity ratio.  
2.3	  The	  Effects	  of	  Bank	  Capital	  Adjustments	  on	  the	  Real	  Economy	  
One important implication of what we have discussed in the preceding sections is that banks’ 
capital decisions are likely to weigh negatively on the demand and supply of credit when they 
seek to increase their equity ratios, and positively when they seek to decrease their equity 
ratios. Firstly, banks will often attempt to pass on higher costs to borrowers through higher 
loan rates. Hence, to the extent that it is more expensive to finance lending with equity than 
debt, an increase in banks’ capital ratio may dampen the credit demand. Secondly, banks’ 
choices from among the various strategies of capital adjustments will have implications for 
bank credit supply. For instance, if banks seek to reduce the quantity of their assets in order to 
increase their equity ratios, they may cut down on lending. Furthermore, instead of reducing 
                                                
4 Related to our discussion of capital structure, this reasoning implies that firms may not be averse to hold high 
equity ratios if they can accumulate this equity over time via retained earnings.  
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the quantity, banks can also reshuffle their risk-weighted assets by substituting risker loans for 
safer. This may reduce the supply of credit to certain sectors, such as to firms (Norges Bank, 
2013). To the extent firms and households are dependent on banks for credit, these capital 
decisions will have real economic effects.  
Theories of financial intermediation investigate whether there are substitutes for bank loans in 
the financial marketplace, and at what price, and for which sectors these substitute products 
are available. These theories place a special emphasis on the effects arising from the 
information problems facing financial markets.5 Borrowers know more about their use of a 
loan and their ability to repay than potential lenders. This asymmetric information causes 
borrowers with better information to use this advantage at the expense of the less-informed 
lenders. If not controlled, the problems can cause financial markets to function inefficiently 
and borrowers may find it difficult to obtain financing.  
To reduce the problems of asymmetric information, the lender must be able to adequately 
monitor the borrower, or the borrower must be able to differentiate itself from other possible 
lower-rated borrowers. The information problems will therefore be less severe for large listed 
firms that are regularly assessed by international credit-rating agencies and where there is a 
lot of public information available. Large firms may consequently be able to access open 
market credit or borrow from non-bank financial intermediaries or other sources (NOU 
2000:9, 2000).  
Households, and small and medium-size businesses, which are more affected by asymmetric 
information, rely on banks for credit. Banks are able to reduce the problems of information 
asymmetry because they have an information advantage in judging borrowers’ quality and 
creditworthiness. This advantage is in part due to the stable long-term relationships that often 
occur between banks and their clients, which provide banks with the ability to collect 
intensive information on their borrowers. It is also argued that the important role banks play 
in the payments system give them more insight into the creditworthiness of potential and 
existing clients than other financial intermediaries (NOU 2000:9, 2000). Since households and 
small and medium-size businesses have no access to alternative finance at all, or only at 
prohibitive costs, the supply of loans by banks is not perfectly substitutable for other funding. 
                                                
5 The theories of financial intermediation do also place emphasis on the existence of transaction costs. These 
costs arise due to different preferences of borrowers and lenders with respect to liquidity, denomination, maturity 
and other parameters of loans. Financial intermediaries reduce these costs.  
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3.	  Bank	  Capital	  Regulation	  	  
The banking system is among the most regulated sectors in the economy. In this section we 
describe the primary consideration for bank regulation and review the different regulatory 
frameworks imposed on the banking industry during our sample period.  
3.1	  The	  Rationale	  for	  Bank	  Regulation	   	  
Banking regulation, in the broadest sense, is justified on the basis of preserving stability in the 
financial system (Norges Bank, 2004). A well-function financial market is crucial for all other 
economic activities in a market-based economy. One of the primary functions to the financial 
system is capital intermediation. That is to transfer resources from savers to investors. Capital 
intermediation often takes the form of providing credit, which is the key to economic growth. 
New businesses cannot start without credit, and existing businesses cannot expand without it. 
Because banks are the primary provider of credit, crisis in the financial system impacts the 
supply of credit to the broader economy and in turn economic growth. Instability in the 
financial system will also impede banks ability to perform its other socially useful activities, 
which the distribution of risk and the provision of a system for payments (Allen, 2013).    
3.1.1	  Basis	  of	  Micro-­‐Prudential	  Regulation	  	  	  	  
Banks’ clients place deposits and buy products based on the notion that banks manage their 
funds in a responsible manner. However, individual depositors lack the tools to monitor banks 
adequately and the hence information to judge the safety and soundness of banks. Not only do 
the depositors lack the information and tools to assess bank risk, they also lack the incentives 
to do so as their deposits have become implicitly, or explicitly, insured and guaranteed. The 
depositors will only focus on expected return and put their deposits into banks providing them 
with the highest deposit interest rate. The insurance premium banks pay for the deposit 
guarantee does not reflect their relative riskiness. The result is therefore under-pricing of risk, 
which may potentially lead bank owners and managers to take on more risk than they 
otherwise would have done. One important purpose of micro-prudential bank regulation is 
therefore to protect the interests of small and uninformed investors (Norges Bank, 2004).  
Micro-prudential regulation seeks to enhance the safety and soundness of individual banks. 
However, while banks may appear to be solid individually, the banking system as a whole 
may be vulnerable. Banking regulation must therefore include a macro-prudential perspective 
that focuses on the sources of systemic risk.    
 
 
13 
3.1.2	  Basis	  of	  Macro-­‐Prudential	  Regulation	  
Systemic risk involves the risk that the financial system is no longer capable of performing its 
tasks in a satisfactory manner. This type of risk can be derived from financial imbalances that 
build up over time or transmission effects between institutions. In other words, systemic risk 
has both a time and cross-sectional dimension.  
The time dimension relates to the interactions between the financial system and the real 
economy. The dynamics of the financial system and real economy may reinforce each other 
over the economic cycle. When asset prices are increasing, credit risk may be perceived as 
low. Credit growth may then rise and contribute to even higher asset prices. Mutually 
reinforcing increases in credit and asset prices cumulate in a bubble that reaches its bursting 
point. The systemic risk increases with the debt-ratios, both within and outside the financial 
system. As the economic cycle turns, previously unseen risks may materialise and the 
willingness to take risk may decline, increasing the amplitude of the boom (Caruana, 2010).     
The cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk focuses on the distribution of risk in the 
financial system at a given point in time. It relates to how a may shock increase widely and 
become systemic through direct and indirect linkages across institutions. Banks are directly 
exposed to one another, for instance, through settlement and interbank linkages. A shock 
hitting one bank can therefore easily spread and inflict losses on other institutions that are 
connected to it (Caruana, 2010). Banks may also share common exposures outside the 
banking system. Shocks to the financial system or adverse macroeconomic developments may 
therefore cause banks to suffer substantial losses indirectly. Systemic risk that arises through 
indirect linkages often becomes evident during a financial crisis. Banks may be forced to sell 
off assets. The value of these assets will then fall and weaken the balance sheets of other 
banks holding the same type assets (Olsen, 2013).  
Unless each institution internalizes the costs of systemic risk, these institutions will have 
incentives to take risks that are not just borne by the individual institution, but instead by the 
society as a whole. Macro-prudential regulation aims to dampen the buildup of systemic risk 
by introducing instruments that force banks to internalize the costs imposed in the system. 
(Acharya, 2011). The macro perspective of banking regulation is relatively new. Frameworks 
for macro-prudential regulation are now being established in a number of countries for the 
first time (Olsen, 2013).  
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3.2	  Capital	  Adequacy	  Requirements	  and	  the	  Basel	  Accords	  	  
Norwegian commercial banks have been subject to capital adequacy regulations since the law 
on “aktiebanker” in 1924. Originally, banks were required to hold a minimum level of 10 
percent capital of their total assets. However, from the beginning of the 1960s to the end of 
1980s a liberalization of the capital adequacy regulations took place. Both the minimum 
requirements and the quality of banks’ capital were reduced. The liberalization contributed to 
a strong growth in credit and house prices, which ended in a banking crisis and a severe 
economic downturn in the early 1990s (Finanstilsynet, 2013a).  
Lessons learned from the banking crisis have played an important role in the development of 
Norwegian capital adequacy regulations since the beginning of the 1990s. At the same time, 
the development has been towards greater international harmonization. In 1988 the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision proposed the first guidelines for a regulatory framework 
based on uniform guidelines. Within a few years, the new capital standards were incorporated 
into the national regulation of, among others, countries of the European Union (EU). In 
Norway, the framework is implemented through EU legislation. The EEA-agreement6 that 
entered into force in 1994 commits Norway to adopt European Union rules.  
3.2.1	  Basel	  I	  	  
The aim of the Basel I proposals from 1988 was to preserve stability in the international 
banking system through harmonized and more stringent rules on capital adequacy. The 
framework introduced two new concepts: risk-weighted assets and tiers of capital. These 
concepts account for the fact that not all assets are equally risky and not all types of capital 
are equally capable of absorbing losses.    
3.2.1.1	  Risk-­‐Weighted	  Assets	  
In a regulatory capital context, requirements are set in relation to the riskiness of assets rather 
than just the assets themselves. The Basel I accord defined risk weights for different 
categories of assets and off-balance sheet exposures7. The risk weights aim to measure the 
credit risk associated with a particular category of assets. Credit risk is the risk of losses due 
to the failure of a bank borrower or counterparty to meets its obligations. More risky 
categories are assigned a higher weight. In order to get the risk-weighted assets, which is the 
                                                
6 EEA = European Economic Area 
7 Off-balance sheet exposures or assets include futures, forwards, options etc.   
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denominator of a bank’s regulatory capital ratio, one multiplies these risk weights with the 
corresponding assets and adds these values together,  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 −𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠! = 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!,! ∙ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!! . 
Thus, the more risky assets a bank holds, the more capital it is required to hold. Under Basel I 
the risk weight for residential mortgages was 50 percent, while the weight for commercial 
loans was set to 100 percent. In 1996, the Basel Committee refined the framework to also 
address market risk, i.e. the risk of losses due to changes in market prices, such as equity 
prices, interest or exchange rates (Federal Reserve , 2003). 
3.2.1.2	  Tiers	  of	  Capital	  	  
Just as all assets are not equally risky, all types of capital are not equally capable of absorbing 
unexpected losses. The Basel Committee therefore defined capital for regulatory purposes in 
two tiers. The key element of capital, or the capital of the highest quality, is common equity 
Tier 1.8 It consists of common equity after regulatory capital detections. Intangible assets, 
such as goodwill and deferred taxes are some of the most important capital detections. 
Supplementary Tier 2 capital consists of subordinated debt and other debt and equity 
instruments that can be used to cover unexpected losses. Together, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital constitutes banks’ total capital base. The minimum requirement to the total capital 
base was set to 8 percent of the value of its risk-weighted assets. The Basel Accord also 
required a bank’s capital base to consist of at least 50 percent common equity Tier 1 capital 
(BCBS, 1988).    
3.2.1.3	  Criticism	  of	  Basel	  I	  	  	  
Basel I was an important step forward for banking regulation, but proved to be too simple to 
address the activities for the most complex banking organizations. The main criticism was 
directed at the limited differentiations among degrees of risk. Basel I defined only four broad 
risk weightings, for example, 100 percent for commercial loans. However, assets assigned the 
same risk weight could vary greatly in credit quality. This means that the calculated capital 
ratios often were uninformative and gave misleading information on a bank’s capital 
adequacy relative to its risk (Federal Reserve , 2003). Furthermore, the limited differentiation 
among degrees of risk enabled banks with a high appetite for risk to shift their loan portfolio 
                                                
8Common equity Tier 1 was originally only referred to as Tier 1 capital. However, under Basel II the definition 
of Tier 1 was expanded to also include subordinated debt. Common equity Tier 1 is today referred to as CET1. 
We return to this in the section on Basel II.   
 
 
16 
towards high-risk borrowers, and boost their profits in the short run, without this resulting in 
more stringent requirements. By the end of the 1990s, Basel I was seen as having outlived its 
usefulness (Finanstilsynet, 2013a).        
3.2.2	  Basel	  II	  	  
In response to the criticism of Basel I, the Basel Committee decided in 1999 to propose a new, 
more comprehensive capital standard. Basel II entered into force in 2007 and is built on three 
mutually reinforcing elements, or “pillars”.   
3.2.2.1	  The	  Pillars	  
The first pillar addresses the minimum capital requirements. The minimum required Tier 1 
and total capital ratio did not change from Basel I.9 However, Basel II made substantial 
changes to the methodologies for determining a bank’s risk-weighted assets in order to make 
the minimum capital requirements more sensitive to the bank’s risk profile. While Basel I 
offered a single approach for determining required capital to cover credit risk, Basel II offered 
banks a choice between the standardised approach and the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach. The standardised approach is similar to Basel I in that the capital requirement is 
determined by categorising and weighing a bank’s assets according to fixed risk weights set 
by the regulator. However, Basel II introduced more risk weights and the use of external 
credit rating to evaluate corporate risk exposures. The IRB approach encourages banks to 
create their own internal system to calculate the required capital to cover credit risk. Under 
the IRB approach each bank must evaluate its assets in terms of the most important elements 
of credit risk. These elements are probability of default during a given period, the likely size 
of the loss given default, the amount of exposure at default, and the effective maturity of the 
exposure. IRB banks use a formula stated by the regulator to calculate the risk weights. The 
formula is a function of the elements of credit risk. In addition to the modified treatment of 
credit risk, Basel II introduced capital requirements for operational risk to adequately guard 
against failure in internal processes, the decision-making of individuals, systems, and other 
external events (Federal Reserve , 2003). 
The second pillar addresses supervisory oversight. It requires banks to make a comprehensive 
assessment for themselves of the whole spectrum of risk they might face, including those not 
captured in Pillar 1. It promotes the notion that banks should seek to perform for themselves a 
comprehensive assessment of whether they have sufficient capital to support their risk profile, 
                                                
9 Tier 1 must be equal at least 4 % and total capital at least 8% of the risk-wighted assets.  
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rather than simple compliance with minimum capital requirements. Furthermore, Pillar II 
gives supervisors discretion to create a buffer capital requirement over the minimum 
requirement as calculated in Pillar 1, if banks are seen to be avoiding the capital adequacy 
goals of the Basel Accord.  
The third pillar is designed to increase market discipline by requiring banks to publicly 
disclose information on their risk management and risk distribution. This information includes 
statistics on the aggregate amounts of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, risk-weighted capital ratios, 
market and operational risk.    
3.2.2.2	  Criticism	  of	  Basel	  II	  	  
An important criticism of Basel II is its possible pro-cyclical effect on economic activity. 
Under the IRB approach, capital requirements are an increasing function of the banks 
estimates of the probabilities of default, and losses, given default of their loans and other 
assets. These inputs are likely to be higher in downturns and lower in upturns. Thus, during an 
economic downturn banks may fall under the required regulatory capital, which may induce 
them to contract the supply of credit, thereby amplifying the economic cycle. Conversely, 
during an economic upturn the decrease in capital requirements may induce banks to expand 
the supply of credit, which may fuel a credit-led boom (Andersen, 2009).   
The determination of capital requirements under Basel II has been subject to further criticism. 
The IRB approach provided banks with incentives to improve their risk management because 
banks eligible for this approach could expect lower capital requirements than those who used 
the standardised approach. One important precondition was, however, that Basel II not should 
cause the aggregate level of regulatory capital in the banking system to decrease significantly. 
Supervisory oversight and a sounder basis for market discipline were intended to prevent this.   
Nevertheless, the transition from Basel I to Basel II led to a marked decline in capital 
requirements for large banks. Since the average risk weights under Basel II have declined, the 
difference between reported capital adequacy ratios and unweighted capital ratios have 
increased (Syvertsen, 2012).  
The financial crisis that took hold of financial markets around the globe in 2007-2008 
revealed weaknesses in the approach that had been developed under Basel II. Banks’ capital 
adequacy was not sufficient to cover the losses that occurred. Basel II did not adequately 
anticipate sources of risk, such as a collapse in market liquidity or deep losses in the market 
value of securities held by banks. The crisis also showed the need to address systemwide risk 
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that can build up across banks as well as the pro-cyclical amplifications of these risks over 
time. In the light of the experiences, the Basel Committee put forward new recommendations 
on stricter capital regulations in 2010 (BCBS, 2010).  
3.2.3	  Basel	  III	  and	  CRD	  IV	  
In Europe, the Basel III standard is reflected in the new Capital Requirements Directive IV 
(CRD IV). This will apply to Norway under the EEA agreement. The phase-in started summer 
of 2013 and will continue until summer of 2016. CRD IV contains new rules that increase the 
quality and quantity of a bank’s capital. The minimum required total capital ratio will still be 
8 percent, but a larger proportion of this has to be of the highest-quality capital – CET1.  This 
proportion must be at least 4.5 percent of the risk-weighted assets, while Tier 1 capital must 
be at least 6 percent. Tier 1 capital includes certain forms for hybrid-capital. The aim of 
increasing the requirements for capital of highest quality is to bring banks’ loss-absorbing 
capacity more in line with their actual risk (European Commission, 2013).  
The new regulatory framework introduces additional capital buffers that banks are required to 
hold on top of the minimum capital requirements. The capital conservation buffer must 
consist of 2.5 percent CET1 capital and is, as the name indicates, intended to conserve capital. 
CRD IV also introduces a systemic risk buffer in order to prevent and mitigate long-term 
systemic or macroprudential risks. Currently, Norwegian banks must hold a systemic risk 
buffer of 2 percent CET1, but the buffer requirement will increase to 3 percent in July 2016. 
On top of that, systemically important banks must hold a buffer of 1 percent. This requirement 
will increase to 2 percent in July 2016. Failure to meet the capital buffer requirements will 
imply constraints on distributions on dividends and repurchase of its own shares. The 
conservation buffer and capital buffers for systemic risk and systemic importance will be 
permanent add-ons.   
3.2.3.1	  Countercyclical	  Capital	  Buffer	  
Another key element, proposed in Basel III and reflected in CRD IV, is the countercyclical 
capital buffer. The aim of the countercyclical capital buffer is to strengthen banks’ resilience 
to an economic downturn and to counter the pro-cyclical effects of banks’ credit supply that 
may reinforce the economic cycle. It is a time-varying requirement and will normally be 
between zero and 2.5 percent of a bank’s risk-weighted assets. In economic upturns, when 
credit growth is high, the requirement will increase. This may increase banks’ funding costs 
and consequently reduce their supply of credit. When the economic cycle turns, the 
 
 
19 
requirement may be released in order to allow banks to draw on the capital buffer in the event 
of large losses. This may induce banks to reduce their lending less than they otherwise would 
have done (European Commission, 2013).  
Norges Bank will provide The Norwegian Ministry of Finance with advice on the level of the 
countercyclical buffer. The setting is going to be explained and announced four times a year. 
Based on the purpose of the countercyclical buffer, Norges Bank has formulated three criteria 
for setting the appropriate buffer rate: 
1) “Banks should become more resilient during an upturn.” 
2) “The size of the buffer must also be viewed in the light of other requirements applying 
to banks.” 
3) “Stress in the financial system should be alleviated.” 
Norges Bank`s advice on the buffer rate will primarily be based on four key indicators, found 
useful in theoretical and empirical literature in signaling the buildup of financial imbalances. 
The indicators are as follows: 
a) The ratio of total credit10 to mainland GDP. 
b) The ratio of house prices to household disposable income. 
c) Commercial property prices. 
d) The wholesale funding ratio of Norwegian credit institutions.  
As the basis of its advice, Norges Bank will perform comprehensive assessments of the 
development in these indicators and compare historical trends and averages to the current 
situation (Norges Bank, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 C2 households and C3 enterprises mainland Norway. 
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4.	  Defining	  a	  Bank	  Capital	  Target	  
Debt guarantees, distortionary taxes and asymmetric information cause bank owners to have a 
preference for low equity ratios. Indeed, based on traditional moral hazard theory, several 
theoretical models on bank capital structure therefore predict that banks want to hold less 
capital than what is required by the regulatory authorities (Keeley, 1990; Marshall & Prescott, 
2000). These predictions imply that a bank will set its capital ratio at the lowest level 
permitted by capital regulations. Moreover, they suggests that there should be little variation 
in capital levels across banks and over time, since the Basel regulatory regime prescribes a 
uniform capital ratio. However, banks’ balance sheets displays a large variation in capital 
ratios, well in excess of the minimum required. In the following we extend our discussion in 
section 2 and provide some possible explanations to the observed capital levels among banks. 
Furthermore, we propose a simple derivation of a model that shows us that a profit-
maximising bank’s choice of capital level can be understood as an adjustment cost story with 
costs/benefits to deviate from an optimal level.  
4.1	  What	  Do	  We	  Know	  About	  Banks`	  Target	  Capital? 
Academic studies argue that banks hold capital in excess of the regulatory minimum in order 
to reduce the likelihood of a regulatory intervention or the need to raise capital or reduce 
assets at short notice (Lindquist, 2003; Stolz & Wedow, 2005; Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, 
Lee, & Öztekin, 2008). When a bank experiences an unexpected decrease in its capital ratio, 
close to or below the required minimum, the bank become subject to supervisory intervention, 
which in turn implies costs that decrease the value of the bank. Furthermore, adjustments to 
the capital ratio bear both direct and indirect costs, i.e. issuing new shares may be interpreted 
as a signal that the shares are overvalued. Hence, excess capital may act as an insurance that 
lower failure costs due to a decrease in the probability of failure. As Lindquist (2003) points 
out, the price and the value of this insurance are likely to affect the level of capital held by 
banks. The price will affect capital negatively. The value of the insurance depends on the risk 
embedded in the bank’s assets, i.e. the probability of experiencing unexpected losses, and 
should vary positively with capital.  
A high capital ratio may also be interpreted as a signal of the bank’s low probability of failure 
and work as an instrument, which the bank is willing to pay for in the competition for 
uninsured deposits and money market funding (Lindquist, 2003). Uninsured depositors 
compensate for bank risk by demanding a higher return. A bank may therefore have 
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incentives to reduce its risk and hence the costs of funding by holding relatively high capital 
ratios. The relevance of this argument depends on the extent of the governmental debt 
guarantee, the bank’s share of uninsured liabilities and how well the creditors are the able to 
observe the bank’s risk behaviour. Thus, the first factor reduces the banks incentives to hold 
excess capital, but the other factors encourage it to limit the risk of insolvency by increasing 
the capital ratio (Tabak, Noronha, & Cajueiro, 2011). Furthermore, a well-capitalized bank 
may be in a better position to obtain funds quickly. As argued by Jokipii and Milne (2008), 
this may improve a bank’s ability to exploit unexpected investment opportunities. In the case 
of a sudden increase in loan demand, a poorly capitalized bank with difficulties in raising 
capital and additional funds on a very short notice may lose market share to its well-
capitalized competitors.  
Alfton et al. (2005) argue that larger banks may be less liquidity-constrained and have smaller 
costs in adjusting their capital ratios. Hence, there may be a negative relationship between 
bank size and capital as large banks can issue more capital and debt on demand rather than 
holding substantial amounts of excess capital. This negative relationship may also have 
alternative explanations. Unexpected losses may be due to information asymmetries in the 
lender-borrower relationship. As argued by Lindquist (2003), the risk-management techniques 
of large banks may be more developed than those of smaller banks. Economies of scale in 
screening and monitoring borrowers provide large banks with advantages in measuring risk 
involved in each project they lend money to. Thus, they require less capital as insurance 
against failure. Moreover, if portfolio diversification increases with bank size, larger banks 
are likely to face a lower probability of experiencing a large drop in the capital ratio. Another 
argument for the negative size effect is related to the “too-big-to-fail” hypothesis. There is a 
higher probability that larger banks will be bailed out by the government in the case of 
financial distress, due to potential systemic effects. Hence, if this kind of support is not 
expected to the same extent by small banks, large banks are likely to target a relatively lower 
capital ratio. 
4.2	  A	  Model	  of	  Capital	  Adjustment	  
A profit-maximizing bank may want to reach a target capital ratio. If the bank is over-
capitalized, i.e. holds a higher capital ratio than its target, the bank faces an opportunity cost. 
It can reduce its total funding costs by reducing its capital level because equity is more 
expensive than debt. If the bank is under-capitalized, i.e. has a capital deficit with respect to 
its target, it may face both supervisory and market constraints. This translates into higher 
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uncertainty and higher interest on debt. The bank may thus have incentives to raise its equity 
levels. 
However, as explained earlier, the bank also faces costs in adjusting its capital ratio. Profit-
maximising banks will consequently try to minimize the sum of these two types of costs. A 
simple model of banks’ total costs related to capital adjustment can be considered in order to 
understand the key mechanism at stake. If we assume that the costs of deviations from target 
capital ratio and the costs of capita adjustments are both quadratic and additive, the banks’ 
total adjustments costs can be expressed as:   𝐶!,! = 𝛼(𝑘!,!∗ − 𝑘!,!!!)  ! + 𝛾(𝑘!,! − 𝑘!,!!!)!,                                 (2) 
where 𝐶!,! is the total cost capital adjustments. The first term in equation 2 reflect costs 
associated with deviations between the target capital ratio 𝑘!,!∗   and the actual capital ratio 𝑘!,!!!. The weight on the costs of this deviation is captured by 𝛼. The second term reflects the 
costs of capital ratio adjustments, with the corresponding weight 𝛾. In order to minimize 𝐶! 
with respect to 𝑘!,!, we derive the first order condition: 𝜕𝑐!,!𝜕𝑘!,! =   𝛼2(𝑘!,!∗ − 𝑘!,!!!)   + 𝛾2(𝑘!,! − 𝑘!,!!!) = 0, 
or 
𝑘!,! − 𝑘!,!!! = !!!! 𝑘!,!∗ − 𝑘!,!!! .                                           (2)  
Equation 2 is a partial adjustment equation in the case of a profit-maximising bank. In each 
period t, a bank i tries to close a proportion 𝛼 𝛼 + 𝛾  of the deviation between its target 
capital ratio at time t and its actual capital ratio in time t-1 (Dang, Garrett, & Nguyen, 2012). 
This proportion is often referred to as the adjustment speed, which increases with 𝛼 and 
decreases with 𝛾. That is to say, the higher weight on the costs associated with deviations 
from the target capital ratio, the faster the convergence towards the target capital ratio, and the 
higher weight on costs associated with capital adjustments, the slower convergence towards 
the target capital ratio.     
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5.	  Other	  Relevant	  Literature	  
This master thesis relates to the empirical literature on the determinants of optimal capital 
structure and how fast firms (banks) can adjust towards this optimal level. Using a partial 
adjustment model, a large stand of this literature indicates that firms do have entity-specific 
targets for their capital structures and speed of adjustments towards these. For instance, 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) find in their well-known study that a typical firm closes over 30 
percent of the gap between its target and its actual debt ratio each year. Berger et al. (2008) 
focus on the capital structure of US banks and finds that they on average close between 28 
percent and 41 percent of the gap between its actual and its desired capital ratio in one year. 
Further, that poorly capitalized banks tend to adjust their capital ratio more quickly than their 
better-capitalized competitors. Banks that record high volatility in their return on assets tend 
to have higher capital ratios. The authors also find that optimal capital structure depend on 
bank size. Smaller banks tend to have higher optimal capital ratios than larger institutions. In 
their study of German banks, Memmel and Rupach (2010) show that corporate banks as well 
as banks with a high share of liquid assets adjust to their capital level more quickly. The 
authors also find that the target capital ratio increases with asset volatility and decreases with 
the speed of adjustment. Brewer et al. (2008) studies capital ratios across countries by 
modeling capital structure as a function of important country-level public policy and bank 
regulatory characteristics, as well as of bank-specific variables and macroeconomic 
conditions. The results indicate that the bank-desired level of capital increases with risk. 
Banks maintain higher capital ratios in countries where the banking industry is relatively 
small and in countries with effective regulatory frameworks that prompt corrective actions 
and good corporate governance. 
The papers mentioned above study the determinants and speed of adjustments towards 
optimal capital structures. Of similar importance is how banks adjust towards these. Maurin 
and Toivanen (2012) investigate how banks in the Euro area react to a deviation from their 
target capital ratio in terms of adjustments in their asset composition. Their results suggest 
that the adjustment towards the target has significant effect on banks’ assets. Moreover, the 
impact on the composition of security holdings is greater than the impact on the composition 
of loans. Kok and Schepens (2013) accounts for the fact that banks’ reaction may be 
asymmetric, depending on whether they are above or below their target. They find that 
European banks prefer to increase equity levels or reshuffle risk-weighted assets without 
making any real changes to the total assets when they are above their target Tier 1 capital 
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ratio. On the other hand, when below the target, banks prefer to reshuffle assets or increase 
their assets holding in order to adjust towards the target again.     
 
Francis and Osborne (2009a) study how deviations from optimal capital levels affect the 
growth in different balance-sheet components, while especially focusing on the impact of 
bank-specific capital requirements. The authors find that banks with capital surplus tend to 
have higher growth in loans and other on- and off-balance sheet assets than those with capital 
shortfall. At the same time, they find that banks with capital surplus have lower growth in 
regulatory capital and Tier 1 capital. Based on these finding, they argue that tighter regulatory 
standards may have cost in terms of reduced loan supply.  
 
Several other papers within this literature focus on how the target capital deviation affects 
lending. Hancock and Wilcox (1994) show that bank lending was restrained by capital 
shortfalls relative to internal targets during the 1990s. The authors indicate that some of the 
banks reduced lending to satisfy higher capital requirements implied by the introduction of 
Basel I. However, of similar importance, they find that the shortfall of bank capital below 
their own target level was a limiting factor on banks’ credit flow. Berrospide and Edge (2010) 
studied how the capital ratios of US banks impact the growth in their credit flow. They find 
that changes in bank capitalization have a very modest effect on bank lending. Their results 
suggest that factors like economic activity and perceived macroeconomic uncertainty play the 
most important role in determining total loan growth.  
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6.	  Data	  
We estimate our models by using quarterly panel data on Norwegian banks between 1993Q1 
and 2013Q1. The data are provided by Norges Bank and has their origin in quarterly financial 
statements that all banks are obliged to report (ORBOF). We have access to data back to 
1991Q1, but have chosen not to apply data before 1993Q1 due to the 1988-1992 banking 
crisis in Norway. During this period, banks’ capital was subject to large disturbances due to 
substantial loan losses and capital injections from the Government Bank Insurance Fund and 
other governmental programs (Vale, 2004). Including these years in our sample might distort 
our findings. 
To adjust the data for mergers and acquisitions (M&A), we create a new bank after such 
events11. The motivation for creating a new bank is to capture the possible change in the 
unobserved heterogeneity of the acquiring bank. Bank-specific factors such as management, 
group of clients and the mix of markets in which the banks operate may be different in the 
post-merger period. Information provided by The Norwegian Saving Banks Association and 
Finance Norway (FNO) on the structural developments in the Norwegian banking industry 
was used to identify M&A activity.12  We further adjust for structural changes in banks that 
may not be captured by the identification of M&A activity by creating a new bank whenever 
both capital and assets fall or rise more than 50 percent.  
We make adjustments to our dataset in order to reduce the influence of missing and extreme 
values. We exclude observations where total assets and risk-weighted assets are missing. This 
leads to a fall of 793 observations. The drop is mainly due to missing values of risk-weighted 
assets on Norwegian-registered foreign banks (NUFs), which are not obliged to report 
information of their capital adequacy. In addition we exclude observations where key 
variables to construct our explanatory variables are missing.  
Extreme values will not add value to our analysis. Hence, variables that contain observations 
that with reasonable certainty can be deemed extreme, by investigating their distribution, are 
winsorized. Subtracting the 75% percentile value from the 25% percentile value, then adding 
this value to the median of the distribution provides us with the cutoff points. Observations 
outside this interval are excluded. Finally, we drop banks with less than 10 consecutive 
                                                
11 Alternatively, we could include a dummy variable equal one for the acquirer in the quarter of the merger and 
zero otherwise. However, by this approach we would assume that the unobserved idiosyncratic factors affecting 
banks optimal target to be the same in the post-merger period as in the pre-merger period.    
12 Information on structural development and mergers, see The Norwegian Savings Banks Association (2013) for 
saving banks and Finance Norway (FNO) (2013) for commercial banks.  
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observations for econometric purpose. This leaves us with an unbalanced panel with 8707 
observations of 132 savings banks and 20 commercial banks. Data on macroeconomic 
indicators and central bank policy are provided by Statistics Norway (SSB). We do not make 
any adjustments to these data.  
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7.	  Empirical	  Strategy	  	  
In this section we present our empirical strategy. We describe the empirical approach we use 
to estimate banks’ implicit target capital ratios and to estimate and assess how they move 
towards these targets. Our approach draws on Francis and Osborne (2009a), and Kok and 
Schepens (2013). It involves three steps. In the first step we specify and estimate a partial 
adjustment model of bank capital. This step is justified by theory and empirical evidence that 
banks face rigidities and adjustment costs that may prevent them from making instantaneous 
capital adjustment. The model allows us to investigate banks-specific determinants of the 
implicit target capital ratios, and the speed with which they adjust towards them. In the second 
step we use the estimated parameters from this model to derive each bank’s long-run capital 
target and calculate the deviations from it in each period in time. Finally, we use the measure 
of these deviations to estimate models of capital and asset growth to assess how banks move 
towards their long-run target capital ratios.         
7.1	  Estimating	  the	  Bank	  Capital	  Targets	  	  
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating a model of the factors that govern banks 
capital choices. A bank’s capital ratio is likely to fluctuate around an unobserved target. At 
each time period t, the bank observes the deviation from its target at the end of period t-1 and 
takes action to close this gap during the next period t. Deviations from the target capital ratio 
impose some costs to the bank, for example, by increasing its funding costs. On the other 
hand, adjustments in the capital ratio may also be costly due to market frictions and 
asymmetric information. Banks more or less rapidly adjust towards their target depending on 
this cost-benefit analysis (Duprey & Lé, 2014). As we do not observe the capital ratio target, 
we have to approximate it. We estimate the target as a linear combination of some important 
factors affecting the capital ratio, bank-fixed effects and time-fixed effects. As suggested by 
the model (see equation 2) we estimate banks’ capital ratios in a partial adjustment 
framework. 𝑘!,! − 𝑘!,!!! = 𝜆 𝑘!,!∗ − 𝑘!,!!!                                                (3) 
Equation 3 is a partial adjustment model where 𝑘!,! denotes the capital ratio of bank i at time t 
and 𝑘!,!∗  the corresponding target capital ratio. The model specifies that at each period t the 
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bank tries to close a proportion 𝜆13 of the deviation between the target capital ratio in period t 
and the actual capital ratio in t-1.  In this symmetric partial adjustment model, the speed of 
adjustment is assumed to be identical across banks. In a frictionless world, a bank would 
always be able to maintain its target capital ratio at any point in time. In that case, 𝜆 would be 
equal to one. However, the positive cost of capital adjustment precludes immediate 
adjustments to a bank’s target capital ratio (Verbeek, 2012). A high 𝜆 would thus indicate 
substantial adjustments costs and a rather passive management of the capital ratio.    
Assuming that the target capital ratio can be correctly approximated by some observable 
characteristics of banks, as well as by a bank-specific time invariant and unobserved 
component 𝜂! and a constant 𝛿!, we specify the target capital ratio as follows: 
  𝑘!,!∗ = 𝛿! + 𝛽!𝑥!,!,!!!!!!! + 𝜂! .                                                 (4) 
The target capital ratio depends on n observable and bank specific I factors x at time t-1. This 
makes sense because the change in the capital ratio occurring during the quarter t depends on 
the factors observed at the end of quarter t-1. By substituting equation (1) into equation (4), 
rearranging and adding a well-behaved error term 𝑢!,!, we obtain the partial adjustment model 
in its full form:  
𝑘!,! = (1− 𝜆)𝑘!,!!! + 𝜆 𝛿! + 𝛽!𝑥!,!,!!!!!!! + 𝜂!)+ 𝑢!,!,      (5)       
Based on equation (5), our estimated specification of the partial adjustment model takes the 
following form: 
                     𝑘!,! = 𝜋!  +  𝜋!𝑘!,!!! + 𝜋!𝑥!,!,!!!!!!! +𝛼! + 𝑢!,!,                                (6) 
where the 𝜋! is a constant term equal to 𝜆𝛿!, the parameter 𝜋! corresponds to (1− 𝜆), and  𝜋! to 𝜋! represents the parameters of the vector 𝑥!,!,!!!, and is equal 𝜆𝛽! to 𝜆𝛽!. Finally, 𝛼! 
represent the bank-fixed effects and corresponds to 𝜆𝜂! in equation (5).  
                                                
13 This proportion 𝜆 is equal to 𝛼 𝛼 + 𝛾  as defined in equation 2. Hence, 𝜆 increase with the weight on the 
costs associated with deviations from the target capital ratio (𝛼) and decrease with the weight on costs associated 
with capital adjustments.  
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We approximate the target capital ratio based on a restricted but important set of observables 
from banks’ balance sheets (𝑥!,!,!!!). In line with our discussion of factors affecting a bank’s 
capital ratio, we include proxies for bank size, risk and market discipline. The proxy for bank 
size (SIZE) is calculated by taking the logarithm of total assets. The expected sign of the 
coefficient is expected to be negative.  
Another key determinant of bank capital decisions is the expected cost of failure, which 
depends on the risk profile of the bank. In general, increasing risk level would require a 
higher level of capital. A positive relationship between optimal capital ratios and risk level 
may therefore reflect a market discipline effect as banks attempt to mitigate the impact of 
market reactions on, e.g. their funding costs or access to capital market activities. However, 
moral hazard behavior of banks may cause this relationship to be negative, as regulations and 
guarantees, such as the deposit insurance system, can increase the risk appetite of banks. 
Following Francis and Osborne (2009b) we control for the cost of failure by incorporating an 
ex-post measure of risk, calculated as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RISK). 
Increasing value of this measure implies increasing risk and consequently increasing cost of 
failure. This ratio will have a value of zero if all assets are zero-weighted and one if all assets 
are 100 percent weighted. It may in rare cases exceed one for banks with substantial off-
balance sheet activities. Since RISK can be thought of as a regulatory measure of risk, we also 
include the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets (PROV) to proxy for banks’ internal 
view of the risk embedded in its asset portfolio. Hence, it may be more in line with the banks 
own perception of risk. Again, relatively higher ratios suggest more risk.  
The profitability of banks should also exert some influence on bank capital decisions. From 
the insurance against falling below the minimum requirement perspective, banks may 
substitute high capital ratios with high levels of earnings. However, this is a highly uncertain 
option if earnings are highly variable. The probability of falling below the minimum 
requirement is therefore assumed to increase with the variance of profits. To measure the 
value of the insurance, we include the standard deviation of return on asset (STDROA). The 
standard deviation is calculated based on the eight preceding quarters. We expect the value of 
the insurance, and hence the capital ratio, to vary positively with STDROA. Furthermore, 
holding capital above the minimum requirement implies direct costs of remunerating. Ayuso 
et al. (2004) and Francis and Osborne (2009a) use each institution’s return on equity (ROE) to 
proxy the alternative cost of capital. In this context one would expect a negative relationship 
between the return on equity and the target capital ratio, as a bank’s incentives to hold a 
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capital ratio above the required minimum depend on costs of holding excess capital. However, 
as stressed by Jokipii and Milne (2008) banks’ return on equity may exceed the demanded 
remuneration required by equity holders, and hence reflect a measure of revenue rather than 
costs. A positive relationship between return on equity and capital may therefore reflect 
banks’ preference to raise capital levels through retained earnings. Hence, we include ROE 
with an ambiguous expected sign.  
Subordinated or other uninsured debt holders may be effective in imposing discipline on bank 
behavior. Banks may hold higher capital levels to mitigate the disciplinary impact on funding 
costs or access to capital market activities. To control for the extent the bank is exposed to 
market discipline, we include the ratio of subordinated debt to total assets (SUBD) and expect 
the sign of the coefficient to be positive. For almost half the banks in our sample, this variable 
is missing. In order to conserve sample size we create a dummy variable (D_SUBD), which is 
equal to one for banks whose value of subordinated debt is missing and zero otherwise. At the 
same time, we set the missing values of subordinated debt to zero. Finally, we include the 
average capital ratio of the other banks at the same time period (AVTR), in order to proxy for 
the possible signalling mechanism of a bank’s relative capital ratio. We expect banks that 
want to differentiate themselves from their peers, in order to change the perception of market 
participants, to hold higher capital levels. A summary of the discussion on variables used to 
approximate the target capital ratio is given in table 1 below.   
Table 1. Bank observables used to approximate the target capital ratio 
Variable Definition Expected Sign 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets - 
RISK Risk-weighted assets over total assets + 
PROV Loan loss provisions over total assets + 
STDROA Standard deviation of return on assets  + 
ROE Return on equity +/- 
AVTR Average Tier 1 ratio of the other banks + 
SUBD Subordinated debt over total assets + 
Notes: The table summarises the variables included in the vector 𝑥!,!,!!! that are used to approximate the target 
capital ratio 𝑘!,!∗ . The vector 𝑥!,!,!!! also include a dummy variable equal one for missing values of SUBD.  
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7.2	  Deriving	  Bank	  Capital	  Targets	  and	  Capital	  Deviations	  
With the set of estimated parameters of equation (6), we can calculate the target in equation 
(4) by first deriving the long-run parameters 𝛿!,𝛽!  and 𝜂!. It follows from the derivation of 
our estimation equation (6) that the long-run effect of each explanatory variable is given by: 
𝛽! = 𝜋!  (1− 𝜋!), 
and the time invariant long-run effect for each bank is given by: 
         𝛿! + 𝜂! = (!!!!!)(!!!!) . 14 
Hence, we recover each bank’s time-varying target capital ratio as follows: 
                                              𝑘!,!∗ =    !!  (!!!!) ∙ 𝑥!,!,!!! + !!!!!!!!! .!!!!                   (7)          
Finally, we build the estimated deviation by subtracting the target capital ratio from the 
observed capital ratio:  
     𝑑𝑒𝑣!,! = 𝑘!,!!! − 𝑘!,!∗                                                      (8) 
A positive value denotes a situation where the bank is under-capitalised with respect to its 
target capital ratio, while a negative value denotes a situation where the bank is over-
capitalised. Note that we define the deviation at period t as the difference between the 
observed capital ratio at period t-1 and the target capital ratio at time t. This is because the 
target capital ratio at time t is based on observables at the end of period t-1. When a bank 
chooses the magnitude of its adjustment during period t, it considers the difference between 
its actual capital ratio and its target at the end of period t-1.  
7.3	  Estimating	  Models	  of	  Balance	  Sheet	  Growth	  
The partial adjustment model allow us to asses the factors that determine banks’ capital 
targets and the average speed at which the banks move towards these targets. The model does, 
however, not tell us anything about how the targets are implemented. How do deviations from 
the target impact a bank’s asset and liability composition? In order to address this question we 
                                                
14 An estimate of the time-invariant bank-fixed effects 𝑎! is obtained by the following procedure. After 
estimating equation (6) by the xtabond2 command in Stata, we predict the residuals and regress them on an index 
variable based on our panel variable. The fitted values from this regression correspond to our 𝑎!. When the 
assumptions our estimate of equation (6) are valid, the residuals are consistent. Hence will the estimates of the 
fixed effects based on them be consistent too.    
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develop and estimate models of the change in capital and asset components on the estimated 
deviation from equation (8). We estimate six different equations. The explanatory variables 
are the same in all of the equations, while the dependent variable differ.  
When deviating from its optimal level, a bank may adjust the numerator of the capital ratio. In 
order to assess banks’ responses with respect to capital changes, we model capital in two 
different ways; using (i) change in the total capital base (CB) and (ii) the change in the higher 
quality Tier 1 capital (TR), as dependent variables. The bank may also adjust the numerator of 
the capital ratio. We model banks’ assets in four different ways; using the change in (iii) total 
assets (TA), (iv) risk-weighted assets (RWA), (v) loans to households (Hloans) and (vi) 
commercial loans (Cloans) as dependent variables in the different equations.      
In each of these regressions we include control variables for macroeconomic conditions and 
central bank policy. In particular, we control for general macroeconomic conditions and the 
demand for credit by including real quarterly GDP growth of mainland Norway (GGDP) and 
the inflation rate (INFL). To capture the tightness in the Norwegian monetary policy, we 
include the changes in the central bank rate (FOLIO). We also include quarterly dummies to 
control for seasonal effects (Q).       ∆ln  (𝐼!,!) = 𝛾! + 𝛾!𝑑𝑒𝑣!,! + 𝛾!𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃!,!!! + 𝛾!𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿!,!!! +𝛾!𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑂!,!!! + 𝛾!𝑄!!!!! +   𝜀!,! ,                                                                                         (9) 
where  ∆ln  (𝐼!,!)is the change in the (i) to (vi) different capital and asset items. We expect the 
deviation to be positively correlated with assets and negatively correlated with capital. The 
relative magnitude on the estimated coefficients of the deviation from regression (i) to (iv) 
will provide us with some information on which strategies Norwegian banks have found 
important to convert to the optimal capital target, over our sample period.        
In addition to studying how Norwegian banks on average adjust towards their capital ratio 
target, we control for potential asymmetries in the adjustment behavior. Especially, we are 
interested in the extent to which banks react differently when they are below or above their 
desired ratio. Thus, we create a dummy variable that is equal to zero for observations of banks 
with capital surpluses and one for observations of deficits relative to their target. We use 
interaction terms to control for the potential asymmetric reactions:      ∆𝐼!,! = 𝛾!𝐶𝑉!,!!! + 𝛾!𝑑𝑒𝑣!,! + 𝛾!𝑑𝑒𝑣!,! ∗ 𝐷𝑏!,! + 𝛾!𝐷𝑏!,! + 𝜀!,!.              (10) 
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𝐶𝑉!,!!! is the control variables for general economic conditions and central bank policy, and 𝐷𝑏!,!!!is the dummy variable for banks that are below their optimal capital level. We 
calculate the impact of banks that are above and below their optimal capital ratios based on 
equation (10). The impact for a bank that is below its target is equal to 𝛾! + 𝛾!, while the 
impact for a bank that is above its target is equal to 𝛾!. We expect the impact for a bank that is 
below its capital target to be greater than for a bank that is above its target.     
7.3.1	  Identification	  Issues	  –	  Supply	  vs.	  Demand	  Shifts	  
The model specifications (9) and (10) are intended to capture the effect on the change in 
banks’ different capital and asset items from capital target deviations. In other words, they are 
supposed to give us information about banks’ capital decisions when they are deviating from 
their optimal capital ratios. However, one important point to discuss is what we capture and 
what we do not. For instance, changes in loans on banks’ balance sheets may have two 
sources. First, banks may alter their lending as a result of having to make adjustments to their 
balance sheet because they are constrained by their target. They are likely to increase their 
lending when they are above their target, and decrease their lending when they are below their 
target. Hence, the change in loans on a bank’s balance sheet is a result of a shift in supply. But 
changes in bank loans may also be a result of shifts in the demand from borrowers. In other 
words, it is equally possible that the change in loans on banks’ balance sheets is a demand-
driven shift.  
It is difficult to disentangle the supply- and demand-side effects in our framework. However, 
we try to control for changes in the demand for credit, macroeconomic conditions and 
changes in monetary policy by including the growth rate in GDP, inflation rate, and the 
changes in the key monetary policy interest rate. Furthermore, we intend to capture factors 
that affect the target capital ratio deviations and changes in lending equally, by including time 
dummies.     
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8.	  Econometric	  Methodology	  
Various econometrical issues occur when dealing with panel data. In this section, we describe 
how we address them. Sub-section 8.1 to 8.3 discusses potential estimators, while sub-section 
8.4 summarizes the discussion of the application of the econometric methods. 8.5 describe the 
relevant model diagnostics.    
The regression equations in (6), (9) and (10) includes a bank-specific component (𝛼!). This 
allows us to control for potential unobservable omitted factors that vary across banks and are 
constant over time (fixed effects), such as differences in managerial skills and risk preference. 
However, the fixed effects are a potential source of endogeneity. In particular, explanatory 
variables that are expected to correlate with the fixed effects are endogenous.15 This is 
because the fixed effects are hidden in the error term, (𝛼! + 𝑢!,!).  
8.1	  Removing	  the	  Fixed	  Effects	  
We assume that one or more of the included explanatory variables in equation (6), (9) and 
(10) correlate with the fixed effects (𝛼!). Managerial skills may for instance be related to bank 
size. Larger banks are likely to attract managers with more experience and education than 
smaller banks. We further assume that the disturbances (𝑢!,!) are serially uncorrelated. Jointly, 
these assumptions imply that the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator will produce biased 
and inconsistent coefficient estimates, since some of the included explanatory variables 
correlates with the error term (𝛼! + 𝑢!,!), due to the presence of fixed effects (𝛼!).16 
Moreover, this correlation does not vanish with increased sample size (Bond, 2002). Thus, in 
order to eliminate this source of endogeneity, we should employ estimation techniques that 
account for the fixed-effects component on the error term. One way is to apply a mean-
deviation transformation to each variable to remove the fixed effects:   𝑘!,! − 𝑘!,! = 𝜋! 𝑘!,!!! − 𝑘!,!!! +   𝜋! 𝑥!,!!!! − 𝑥!,!!!! + 𝛼! − 𝛼! + 𝑢!,! − 𝑢! .       (11) 
Using equation (6) as an example, we see that the original observations are expressed as 
deviations from their individual means. 17 Since the individual mean of 𝛼! is 𝛼! itself, it is 
eliminated in the transformation. The OLS estimator for 𝜋! and 𝜋! obtained from this 
                                                
15 Explanatory variables that are correlated with the error term are said to be endogenous (Verbeek, 2012). 
16 A crucial assumption of the OLS estimator is that 𝐸 (𝛼! + 𝑢!,!) , 𝑘!,!𝑥!,!! =0 
17 Where 𝑘!,!!! = !!,!!!!!!!!!!  and the other individual means are defined in a similar way.  
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transformed equation is often called the fixed effects (FE) estimator (Verbeek, 2012). We 
prefer this estimator for equations (9) and (10).   
However, applying this approach to equation (6) introduces a new source of endogeneity. The 
mean-deviation transform induces a correlation between the transformed lagged dependent 
variable 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1− 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1  and the transformed disturbance term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡− 𝑢𝑖 . In particular, the 
lagged dependent variable (𝑘!,!!!) is negatively correlated with 𝑢!, because 𝑢!,!!! are included 
in 𝑢!. In fact, this correlation continues with lags of 𝑘!,!!!because they too are embedded in 𝑢! 
(Roodman, 2009). 18 The FE-estimator therefore yields a downward-bias in the estimate of 𝜋!. 
As the panel length increases, 𝑢!,!!! becomes a smaller part of 𝑢!, and as a result the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the disturbance term declines 
(Flannery & Hankins, 2012). However, even for a large number of time periods, the bias in 
the coefficient estimate may be substantial. By simulations, Judson and Owen (1999) find that 
the bias may be as great as 20% of the true value of the coefficient of interest for panels with 
30 time periods. 
Another commonly used transformation is the first-difference transform, which involves 
subtracting the previous observation of a variable from the contemporaneous one: 𝑘!,! − 𝑘!,!!! = 𝜋! 𝑘!,!!! − 𝑘!,!!! +   𝜋! 𝑥!,!!!! − 𝑥!,!!!! + 𝛼! − 𝛼! + 𝑢!,! − 𝑢!,!!! .   (12)  
Since the fixed effects are time invariant, they are eliminated from equation (6) by first 
differencing. The OLS-estimator will still yield inconsistent and downward-biased estimates 
of 𝜋! because 𝑘!,!!! and 𝑢!,!!! are by definition correlated.19 But unlike with the mean-
deviation transformation, first-differencing does not introduce all realisations of the 
disturbances (𝑢!,!,𝑢!,!…𝑢!,!) into the transformed equation of period t (Bond, 2002). Hence, 
consistent estimates of 𝜋! can now be obtained by applying an instrument-variable approach 
with instruments drawn from within the dataset.  
 
 
                                                
18 𝑘!,!!! correlates with 𝑢!, because 𝑢! includes 𝑢!,!!! etc.    
19 Likewise, any variables in 𝑥!,!!!!  that are not strictly exogenous become endogenous because they might also 
be related to 𝑢!,!!! (Roodman, 2009). 
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8.2	  Instrument	  Variables	  Approach	  	  
An instrument variable should satisfy two conditions. First, the instrument should be 
exogenous. In other words, no correlation between the instrument and the error term should 
exist. Second, the instrument should be relevant, which means that it must correlate with the 
endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2009).  
Natural instrument candidates for the first-differenced lagged dependent variable (Δ𝑘!,!!!)20 
are  𝑘!,!!! and  Δ𝑘!,!!!. These instruments are not correlated with the transformed disturbance 
term (∆𝑢!,!), unless 𝑢!,! exhibits autocorrelation. Moreover, if 𝜋!is different from zero, Δ𝑘!,!!! 
is correlated with 𝑘!,!!! and Δ𝑘!,!!!. Instrument variable estimation using 2SLS to incorporate 
either 𝑘!,!!! or Δ𝑘!,!!! as instruments for the first-differenced lagged dependent variable 
(Δ𝑘!,!!!) are known as the Anderson and Hsiao estimators. In order to identify the parameters 
in the model, these estimators impose one moment condition in estimation. The level 
instrument estimator is based on 𝐸 ∆𝑢!,! 𝑘!,!!! = 0, while the difference instrument 
estimator is based on 𝐸 ∆𝑢!,! (∆𝑘!,!!!) = 0.21 However when available, imposing more 
moment conditions improves the efficiency of the estimators. One can therefore take 
Andersen and Hsiao further by using longer lags of the dependent variable as instruments. To 
the extent this introduces more information, i.e. the additional moment conditions are valid, 
this should improve efficiency. But using standard 2SLS to incorporate longer lags will 
reduce sample size substantially since observations for which lag observations are missing are 
dropped (Roodman, 2009).  
The general method of moments (GMM) provides a convenient framework in this context. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a first-difference GMM (DGMM) model for dynamic 
panels using all available lagged dependent variable levels to instrument for the first 
difference for the lag. Within this framework, the first-differenced model is specified as a 
system of equations, with one equation per time period. GMM excludes observations for 
which no valid instruments are available. However, it does include observations for which 
only a subset of the lags is available. This implies that the instruments available for each time 
period will differ. While only 𝑘!,! can be used in period t=3, both 𝑘!,! and 𝑘!,! are available in 
period t=4.  And finally in period t=T, the vector  (𝑘!,!, 𝑘!,!,… , 𝑘!,!!!) can be used as an 
                                                
20 In the following we denote a variable indifference by Δ. For instance Δ𝑘!,!!!= 𝑘!,!!! − 𝑘!,!!!     
21 The moment conditions states that the instrument is assumed to be uncorrelated with the equations 
transformed error term, i.e. that it is exogenous.  
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instrument for the first differenced equation. This gives rise to an instrument matrix on the 
form:  
𝑍! = 𝑘!,! 0 0 ⋯ 0 ⋯ 00 𝑘!,! 𝑘!,! ⋯ 0 ⋯ 0∙ ∙ ∙ ⋯ ∙ ⋯ ∙0 0 0 ⋯ 𝑘!,! ⋯ 𝑘!,!!!                                   (13) 
The rows in the matrix (𝑍!) corresponds to the first-differenced equation (6) for period 
t=3,4,…,T for bank i. The resulting columns correspond to the set of exploited moment 
conditions:  𝐸 𝑍!!∆𝑢! = 0  for i=1,2,…,N                                    (14) 
where ∆𝑢! = (𝑢!,!,𝑢!,!,… ,𝑢!,!)!. Based on this set of moment conditions, the DGMM-
estimator minimizes the criterion: 
𝐽! = !! ∆𝑢!!𝑍!!!!! 𝑊! !! 𝑍!!∆𝑢!!!!!                                        (15) 
 where 𝑊! is the weighting matrix: 
𝑊! =    !! 𝑍!!∆𝑢!∆𝑢!!𝑍!!!!! !!                                             (16) 
The resulting estimator is called the two-step DGMM-estimator because consistent estimates 
of the first-differenced disturbances (∆𝑢!) are obtained from a preliminary consistent 
estimator. Under the assumption that the disturbances (𝑢!) are independent and identically 
distributed, an asymptotically equivalent estimator can be obtained in one step, using the 
weighting matrix: 
𝑊!! =    !! 𝑍!!𝐻𝑍!!!!! !!                                                (17) 
Here, 𝐻 is a (𝑇 − 2)(𝑇 − 2) matrix with 2´s on the main diagonal, -1 on two sub-main 
diagonals and zeros elsewhere. The resulting estimator is called the one-step DGMM-
estimator, in which 𝑊!! does not depend on any estimated parameters (Bond, 2002).  
Alonso-Borrego & Arellano (1996) show that the DGMM-estimator suffers from a large finite 
sample bias and poor precision if the data generating the process is highly persistent. The loss 
in asymptotic efficiency makes intuitive sense because when a variable is persistent, past 
levels convey little information about future changes. Hence, lagged levels are weak 
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instruments for first-differenced variables in this case. This weak instrument problem is likely 
to be relevenat to our dataset. Table 2 reports estimation results from a simple AR(1) 
specification for the Tier 1 capital ratio series (𝑘!,!). The series is found to be highly 
persistent. The OLS-estimator suggests an autoregressive coefficient close to unity, the FE-
estimator a coefficient around 0.9, whilst the DGMM estimates are found to be significantly 
lower. This downward bias in the DGMM estimate of AR(1) model is consistent with the 
finite sample bias expected in highly persistent series.22   
The high persistence in the process of 𝑘!,! could also indicate a unit root. Hence, we 
additionally test for a unit root. The test is carried out in a Fisher-type approach. The main 
motivation for using this approach is that it can handle unbalanced panels, like ours. Fisher-
type tests combines p-values of the test statistic for a unit root test in each cross-sectional unit 
(Hoang & Mcnown, 2008).23 We use a general specification where we allow for fixed effects, 
time trend, and for serial correlation in the errors. The Fisher-type test strongly reject the null 
hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root.  
 
 
Table 2. AR(1) specifications for the Tier 1 Capital ratio series 
 OLS FE DGMM 𝒌𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 0.972*** 0.892*** 0.680*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.032) 
N 8392 8392 8108 
Note: The table reports the estimation results from an AR(1) specification the Tier 1 capital ratio,         
i.e the dependent variable is 𝑘!,!. Robust standard errors is reported in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistical significance at the 1 percent leve. Instruments in first-difference are dated  t-2 and          
earlier in the DGMM estimations.   
 
                                                
22 See Bond (2002) for a discussion and simulations of this bias.  
23 The unit root test perfomed in each cross section is an Augmented Dickey Fuller test. See Wooldridge (2009) 
for a discussion on this test.  
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8.3	  System	  GMM	  
Altough the series does not appear to have an exact unit root, we do have to account for the 
high persistence in the process of 𝑘!,! and the fact that lagged values in levels are likely to be 
weak instruments for the first-difference transformed variable. Blundell and Bond (1998) 
suggest using a so-called system GMM (SGMM) estimator. The SGMM estimator sets up a 
problem in which the model is specified as a system of equations in levels and first-
differences. Lagged levels are used as instruments for the endogenous variable in first-
difference. This gives rise to a set of moment conditions as specified in (14). The SGMM 
estimator further use lagged differences as instruments for the endogenous variable in levels. 
For variables with high persistence, past changes are likely to convey more information about 
current levels than past levels about future changes. Hence, these instruments may be more 
relevant. The new instruments are valid under the additional assumption that changes in the 
instrument variable (𝑘) are uncorrelated with the fixed effects (𝛼!). That is to say, 𝐸 ∆𝑘!,!𝛼! = 0 for all i and t, and further 𝐸 𝑘!,!𝛼!  is time-invariant. If this holds, ∆𝑘!,!!! is a 
valid instrument for the equation in levels. The additional moment conditions can then be 
specified as:  𝐸 ∆𝑘!,!!!(𝛼! + 𝑢!,!) = 0 for i=1,2,…,N and t=1,2,…,T                    (18) 
The SGMM estimator combines the set of moment conditions specified for the first-
differenced equations with the additional moment conditions specified for the equations in 
levels. This estimator is therefore expected to produce efficiency gains over the DGMM 
estimator, provided that the additional moment conditions are valid. Furthermore, in the 
SGMM context the gain in efficiency from using the two-step estimator over the one-step 
estimator is likely to be greater than in the DGMM context. This is because there is no longer 
a known weight matrix that can be used to construct a one-step estimator that is 
asymptotically equivalent to the two-step estimator (Bond, 2002).   
8.4	  Applications	  of	  The	  Econometric	  Techniques	  	  
We have now discussed several estimators that can be used to produce consistent estimates of 
the parameters in the regression equations (6), (9) and (10). We use the FE estimator to 
estimate the two last. As they not include a lagged dependent variable, the mean-deviation 
transform eliminates the endogeneity problem that arises from the unobserved and time 
invariant bank-fixed effects. While both GMM estimators may produce consistent parameter 
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estimates of equation (6), the SGMM estimates are likely to be the most efficient, mainly 
because the Tier 1 capital ratio is found to be highly persistent.    
In addition to the lagged dependent variable (𝑘!,!!!), we believe that the variable that captures 
portfolio risk (RISK), calculated as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets, becomes 
endogenous when transforming the data. Both variables are therefore instrumented with 
lagged values in levels and lagged values in differences as instruments. The rest of the 
explanatory variables are treated as exogenous.  
In the GMM context, one may use the entire set of lagged values of the endogenous variables 
as instruments, provided that the residuals exhibit no autocorrelation. However, as Roodman 
(2009) states, using too many instruments may bias the coefficient estimates towards those 
from non-instrumenting estimators. We therefor restrict the number of instruments to be less 
than the number of individual banks.24 In particular, we start by using a number of 
instruments equal to the number of individual banks and reduce them step-by-step. For each 
regression we run, we compare the Hansen statistic to the Hansen statistic of the last 
regression. We then use the specification with the lag length that has the highest p-value for 
the Hansen test.25 To further reduce the problem of too many instruments we collapse the 
optimal instrument matrix. This means that we use only one instrument for each variable and 
lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable and lag distance.26  
The first-difference transform has a weakness of magnifying gaps in unbalanced panels. 
Roodman (2009) therefore suggest that we use another transformation called orthogonal 
deviations, when transforming equation (6). Instead of subtracting the previous observation 
from the contemporaneous one, this method subtracts the average of all future available 
observations from each observation of a variable. It is computable for all observations expect 
the last for each bank, no matter how many gaps. Thus, it is used to preserve sample size. We 
apply both transformations to equation (6) and report the one with the better statistical 
diagnostic. Roodman (2009) further suggest that we use two-step estimation method that is 
robust to any patterns of heteroskedasticity that exist in the dataset. The potential downward 
bias of the estimated asymptotic standard errors is corrected by using Windmeijer finite 
sample correction. 
                                                
24 The Stata Xtabond2 command suggest that the number of instruments should be less that the number of 
groups. 
25 This procedure for determining the optimal lag length is suggested by Andrews & Lu (2001).  
26 See Roodman (2009) for details.  
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8.5	  Model	  Diagnostics	  
An important procedure in testing the statistical properties of the model in equation (6) is 
testing the validity of the instruments. The system GMM estimator assumes that the 
idiosyncratic error term, 𝑢!,!, is not autocorrelated.27 If the 𝑢!,! is serially correlated of order 
one, then for example 𝑘!,!!! is correlated to the last term in (𝑢!,! − 𝑢!,!!!) and hence not 
available as a valid instrument after all.28 In order to test for autocorrelation, we apply the 
Arellano-Bond test to the error terms in differences.29 The 𝑚! and 𝑚! procedure tests for 
first- and second-order autocorrelation, respectively. First-order autocorrelation in differences 
is expected since (𝑢!,! − 𝑢!,!!!) and (𝑢!,!!! − 𝑢!,!!!) are mathematically related via the 
shared 𝑢!,!!! term. Thus, we look for second-order autocorrelation in differences in order to 
check for first-order autocorrelation in levels. According to Roodman (2009), this procedure 
is based on the idea that it will detect correlation between the 𝑢!,!!! term in (𝑢!,! − 𝑢!,!!!) and 
the 𝑢!,!!! term in (𝑢!,!!! − 𝑢!,!!!). The null-hypothesis in the Arellano-Bond test is that the 
residuals in difference are free from autocorrelation. Hence, we need to be able to reject the 
null in the 𝑚! test, but not reject it in the 𝑚! test.  
The strength of the instruments is also assessed in the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions. This test regresses the residuals from the estimated regression on all the 
instruments. The null-hypothesis is that all instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals, i.e. 
all instruments are valid. Furthermore, the instruments in the system GMM depend on the 
assumption that changes in the instrument variables are not correlated with the fixed effect. 
Roodman (2009) therefore argues that the estimated coefficient on lagged dependent variable 
should indicate convergence by having an absolute value less than unity.  
Bond (2002) suggests an additional detection for the validity of the GMM estimates. As 
explained earlier, the OLS estimator tends to overestimate the coefficient estimate of the 
lagged dependent variable in dynamic models. On the other hand, the FE estimator tends to 
underestimate the coefficient. Hence, as suggested by Bond (2002) the estimated value of the 
coefficient estimate should lie between the estimates obtained by the OLS and FE-estimators.   
                                                
27 However, the full error term before transformation, 𝜀!,! = 𝑢!,! + 𝛼!, is indeed presumed to exhibit 
autocorrelation since it contains the fixed effects 𝛼!.    
28 Confer the first condition for a valid instrument: the instrument should be exogenous. 
29 The test is also run on residuals in difference after estimation in orthogonal deviations. This is because all 
residuals in deviations are interrelated (see Roodman (2009)).  
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Finally, for all of our regression equations, we report a Wald test for jointly significance of 
the set of coefficients. If the null-hypothesis can be rejected, the variables we have included in 
the models are doing well in predicting the dependent variable.     
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9.	  Results	  	  
9.1	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
9.1.1	  Tier	  1	  Capital	  Ratio	  
Figure 1 shows the development in Norwegian banks’ average Tier 1 capital ratio over the 
years 1993 to 2013. In order to better assess the development in the average regulatory capital 
ratio across banks, we include the average equity ratio, defined as common equity over total 
unweighted assets. As evident from the figure, Norwegian banks operate with capital ratios 
that remain significantly above the regulatory minimum, throughout our sample. The average 
Tier 1 ratio was 15.77 percent over our sample period. The banks started out with an average 
Tier 1 ratio of 14 percent in 1993 and gradually increased their regulatory capital ratio until 
reaching a top in 1995. Then it declined steadily until 2000. Interestingly, we note the 
divergent movement between the regulatory capital ratio and the equity ratio from 2000 to 
2009. While the equity ratio exhibited a downward trend, the Tier 1 ratio remained stable 
between 14 and 16 percent. This development may partly reflect differences arising from the 
denominator of the capital ratio.30             
Figure 1. Bank Capital Ratios, Quarterly Unweighted Means  
 
Notes: This figure shows the development in the average Tier 1 ratio and equity  
ratio over the years 1993 to 2013. The Tier 1 ratio is defined as Tier 1 capital over 
risk-weighted assets, while the equity ratio is defined as equity over total assets.  
                                                
30 It may also reflect differences in the development in regulatory capital relative to common equity.  
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In particular, it is consistent with a rise in banks’ total assets relative to risk-weighted assets. 
Andersen (2010) points to a fall in the average risk-weight of banks’ assets over this period. 
The share of residential mortgages of banks’ total loan portfolio increased from 35 percent in 
the late 1990s to 60 percent by the end of 2005. Residential mortgages have a low risk-weight 
compared to other bank assets. Hence, a substitution to residential mortgages leads to a lower 
average risk-weight. The development in Norwegian banks’ capital ratios contradicts the US 
banks’ risk-behavior over the same period. For these banks, Berrospide and Edge (2010) 
showed that the risk-weighted assets increased faster than the total assets over the period from 
2004 to 2007. This led to an upward trend in regulatory capital ratios and a downward trend in 
equity ratios.      
In line with the need for recapitalisation after the financial crisis and the introduction of 
higher capital requirements, both the regulatory ratio and the common equity ratio have 
exhibited an upward trend since 2009. Finally, we also note that the regulatory capital ratio 
seems to follow a systematic seasonal pattern with a peak in the fourth quarter.   
9.1.2	  Other	  Variables	  
Table 3 below provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in regression equation (6), 
(9) and (10). Panel A reports the variables used to construct the partial adjustment model in 
equation (6), while panel B reports the variables from our regressions of growth in different 
capital and assets items, equation (10). Starting with panel A, we note that none of the banks 
experienced capital ratios (k) below the required minimum. The average bank had a ROE of 
6.3 percent, but the standard deviation suggests a substantial variation. We also note 
observations of RISK above one, which suggest substantial off-balance sheet activities in 
some banks. 
The first 6 rows in panel B report the dependent variables used to estimate equation (9) and 
(10). First, we see that the average growth in total assets (TA) is somewhat higher than the 
average growth in risk-weighted assets (RWA). Further, that the growth in commercial loans 
(CLOANS) is higher than loans to households (HLOANS). CLOANS displays, however, a 
sizeable variation. In the next section we empirically investigate whether banks targeting 
behavior towards optimal capital levels may explain the variation in these variables.    
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Panel A:       
k 8707 .157779 .0449531 .0513306 .3339769 
SIZE 8707 14.43221 1.30868 11.23783 19.17183 
ROE 8707 .0628976 .0406324 -.108065 .2211621 
RISK 8707 .6306283 .0754525 .3677599 1.219541 
PROV 8669 .0119834 .0071883 1.70e-06 .0400447 
STDROA 7629 .0034692 .0014353 .0005262 .0163729 
AVTR 8707 .1617536 .0108228 .1440847 .1848462 
SUBD 8708 .0075435 .0122117 0 .0785149 
      
Panel B:      
TC 8566 .0231885 .0560727 -.4790259 .7614146 
RWA 8566 .0221642 .0404629 -.2907719 .7170583 
TA 8566 .0240013 .0382622 -.2396678 .8288831 
LOANS 8566 .0245196 .0332719 -.4128095 .6692616 
CLOANS 8566 .0342046 .1426749 -1.932661 7.242212 
HLOANS 8566 .0235129 .0393033 -.6087568 1.283813 
GDP 8566 .0072716 .0101999 -.0137039 .0426351 
INFL 8566 .0048934 .0067033 -.0167626 .027766 
FOLIO 8566 -.0006753 .0069433 -.0275 .035 
        Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used to estimate our equations. Panel A 
          represents the variables used in equitation (6), while panel B represents the variables used in (9) and (10).  
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9.2	  Banks’	  Target	  Capital	  Ratio	  and	  Speed	  of	  Adjustment	  
Table 4 displays the estimation results of the partial adjustment equation (6). The Tier 1 
capital ratio is regressed on its own one-period lagged value and a set of bank-specific 
variables, while also taking into account time-fixed effects. The first column presents the 
results from an OLS regression. The second and third columns present the results from FE 
and SGMM regressions, respectively, which also accounts for the bank-fixed effects. The 
SGMM estimator is preferred since the dynamic setup of the model specification (6) leads to 
biased and inconsistent results when using the OLS or FE estimator. However, the results 
from these regressions are included as a robustness check of the SGMM results. A good 
coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable should lie in the interval between the 
OLS and FE estimates. This is the case for our SGMM estimate.  
We treat the lagged dependent variable, 𝑘!,!!!, and the 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾!,!!!variable as endogenous in the 
SGMM regression and use lags in levels and differences as instruments. The instrument set is 
collapsed and the number of instruments is restricted to 161 in order to ensure that the 
estimation does not suffer from instruments’ proliferation. The validity of these instruments is 
confirmed by the Arellano-Bond and Hansen tests. As we see from table 2, the 𝑚! procedure 
suggests that we cannot reject the null-hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in the 
first-differenced residuals. Neither can we reject the null-hypothesis of joint validity of all the 
instruments. Thus, first-order autocorrelated residuals in levels or over-identifications are not 
a source of concerns. The Wald test for the null-hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to 
zero is safely rejected in all three regressions.  
Looking at the results in table 4, we first note that the SGMM coefficient estimate of the 
lagged dependent variable appears to be reasonable. It is statistically significant, above the FE 
estimate and below the OLS estimate. Although the process of 𝑘!,! is highly persistent, it does 
not have an exact unit root.31 We therefore interpret the results in favor of the adjustment cost 
hypothesis, indicating that Norwegian banks do adjust towards an optimal Tier 1 capital ratio. 
However, they do this rather slowly. The coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is 
equal to (1− 𝜆), where 𝜆 denotes the adjustment speed. Thus, we find that Norwegian banks 
on average close 4.1 percent of the gap between their effective and target capital ratio per 
quarter. This speed of adjustment is significantly lower than European banks. Kok and 
Schepens (2013) find that the average European bank uses 3.1 quarters to close its Tier 1 
                                                
31 Confer our unit root test in section 7.4.  
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capital gap. Our corresponding measure is 16.9 quarters.32 The slow speed of adjustment 
among Norwegian banks is in line with the idea that costs of adjusting capital are an 
important explanation of why they hold capital ratios above the regulatory minimum. 
Frictions in the market for equity imply that banks cannot costlessly adjust their capital levels. 
Banks attempt to minimize these costly adjustments by holding higher capital ratios.  
We keep in mind, however, that the estimated coefficient represents the adjustment speed of 
the average Norwegian bank. The speed is likely to vary significantly across banks and over 
time.33 For example, Berger et al. (2008) finds that banks nearer the minimum required capital 
ratio adjust towards their capital target at a faster speed than well-capitalized banks.  
Consistent with the previous literature on bank capital structure, we find a statistically 
significant negative relationship between Tier 1 capital ratios and bank size (SIZE). This 
finding is in line with the view that scale economies in screening and monitoring may reduce 
the need for large banks to hold a capital buffer as an insurance against falling below the 
regulatory minimum. As Lindquist (2003) also points out, a negative correlation between 
capital ratio and size may come from a diversification effect not captured by the risk 
measures. In addition, this relationship may also be related to the too-big-to-fail hypothesis as 
well as the notion that smaller banks may experience greater difficulties in accessing the 
capital markets (Jokipii & Milne, 2008). 
According to our regression analysis, banks with a higher ROE have a higher capital adequacy 
ratio. As discussed in the previous section, we would expect a negative relationship if we 
were to interpret this variable as the alternative cost of capital for banks. Hence, our results 
suggest that the profitability effect of ROE surpassed the cost of capital effect for the banks 
that are included in our analysis. Moreover, the positive and highly significant coefficient also 
contradicts the view that banks substitute high levels of earnings with excess capital as an 
insurance against falling below their required minimum. Berrospide and Edge (2010) also 
report a positive (although not significant) relationship between the capital ratio and earnings. 
They argue, on the other hand, that a positive relationship was as expected as sticky dividend 
payments result in an accumulation of retained earnings and bank capital. 
 
                                                
32 The half-life is calculated by using the formula: !"  (!)! , where 𝜆 is the speed of adjustment.   
33 In unreported results we find that the speed of adjustment varies with the quality of the capital, i.e. the speed 
of adjustment appears to be even slower for common equity capital and higher for the total capital base. 
However, we could not confirm the validity of the instruments in these models.    
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Table 4. Determinants of Bank Capital 
 OLS FE SGMM 
    𝒌𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   0.973*** 0.903*** 0.959*** 
 (332.63) (100.46) (97.25) 
    𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   -0.000503*** -0.00141 -0.000386* 
 (-5.36) (-1.22) (-2.09) 
    𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   0.0168*** 0.0216*** 0.0238*** 
 (4.65) (5.37) (5.43) 
    𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑲𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   -0.00588*** -0.00810** -0.0282*** 
 (-3.76) (-2.88) (-6.06) 
    𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑽𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   0.0486*** 0.0766*** 0.125*** 
 (3.40) (3.38) (4.88) 
    𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   -0.0740 0.0632 0.0660 
 (-1.02) (0.63) (0.75) 
    𝑨𝑽𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   -0.00598 0.0534*** -0.0239* 
 (-0.68) (4.87) (-1.99) 
    𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑫𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   0.00603 0.0327 0.00296 
 (0.39) (1.71) (0.17) 
    𝑫_𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑫𝒊,𝒕!𝟏	   -0.0000246 -0.000825 0.000417 
 (-0.06) (-1.48) (0.84) 
    𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕	   0.00510** 0.00703* 0.0222*** 
 (2.71) (2.53) (5.76) 
Observations 7358 7358 7358 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Bank FE NO YES YES 𝑚!	  Test	     0.000 𝑚!	  Test	     0.330 
Hansen Test   0.400 
Wald Test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is Tier 1 capital ratio (𝑘!,!). One minus the coefficient estimate on 𝑘!,!!! 
corresponds to the speed of adjustment. 𝑘!,!!! and 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾!,!!! are treated as endogenous in the SGMM 
estimation. Lagged differences are used as instruments for equations in levels in addition to lagged 
levels for equations in first differences. Absolute t-values are presented in parentheses. ***,** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level in a two-tailed t-test. Hansen Test refers 
to the test of overidentifying restrictions. 𝑚! and 𝑚! refers to the test of no first-order and second-order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. Wald Test refers to the test of jointly significance of 
the coefficient estimates. P-values are reported for these tests.   
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The results in table 4 suggest that the bank’s level of portfolio risk, captured by a regulatory 
measure (RISK) and a measure that is more aligned with the bank’s own perception (PROV), 
are statistically significantly related to capital ratios. RISK is negatively associated with the 
Tier 1 capital ratio. This may indicate a moral hazard behavior of Norwegian banks. However, 
as Lindquist (2003) and Francis & Osborne (2009a) point out, a negative relationship between 
risk and capital does not necessarily imply that high-risk banks are poorly capitalized relative 
to their level of asset risk. Banks evaluate and respond differently to risk. It may, for instance, 
be that riskier banks hold less capital against a given asset-risk due to better systems and 
controls for risk. Moreover, the statistically significant coefficient estimate on loan-loss 
provisions (PROV) suggests that banks hold higher capital ratios when they perceive their 
asset-portfolio to be more risky. This is inconsistent with moral hazard. The coefficient on 
(STDROA) is not statistically significant different from zero. Thus, we find no evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis that banks substitute high levels of earnings for high capital ratios.  
We failed to find any significant relationship between capital and the traditional measure of 
market discipline, subordinated debt (SUBD), and the coefficient estimate on the average 
capital ratio (AVTR) is somewhat counterintuitive (statistically significant on a 10 percent 
level).       
Having estimated the long-run determinants of bank capital ratios, we proceed to calculate the 
long-run target, as defined in equation (4) and the resulting capital deviations, as defined in 
(8). In order to obtain a target that is as precise as possible, we dropped from the model in (6) 
those variables that were not significant in the first specification and re-estimated the 
equation.34 Figure 2 presents the Tier 1 capital deviation over time. We report the 25th, 50th 
and 75th percentiles to capture the distribution among banks as well as over time. Overall, the 
estimations suggest relatively small deviations from the target Tier 1 capital ratio. From the 
figure we see that capital deviations are narrowed from the start of our estimation period and 
up to year 2000. For more than 50 percent of the banks, the capital deviation turns negative in 
2007. Consistent with the upward trend in regulatory capital ratios in the last few years of our 
estimation period, the capital deviations becomes smaller for banks with capital deficits and 
larger for banks with capital surpluses in the years 2009 to 2013. In what follows we analyze 
how these deviations affect the growth in the banks’ different capital and asset items.    
                                                
34 We dropped STAROA, SUBDTA and D_SUBDTA from the first specification.  
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Figure 2. Tier 1 Capital deviation 
 
         Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the Tier 1 capital deviation. 
         The 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles in each year are presented.  
 
9.3	  Impact	  of	  Capital	  Ratio	  Deviations	  
The results in section 9.2 suggest that Norwegian banks Tier 1 capital ratios converge towards 
internal targets. This means that they respond to deviations from their optimal target by 
making adjustments in their capital and asset positions. In the case of a capital shortfall a bank 
may either raise more capital or shrink its risk-weighted assets. In the following we try to 
capture the impact of Tier 1 capital deviations on six different capital items. For each 
dependent variable, we run 2 regressions. In subsection 9.3.1 we present the results when not 
taking into account potential asymmetric reactions in terms of being below or above the target 
Tier 1 capital ratio. In subsection 9.3.2 we examine whether banks’ responses to capital 
surpluses are different from that of deficits, by interacting a dummy variable equal one for 
banks that are below their target and zero for banks that are above the target, with the 
deviation variable (dev). In all regressions we include controls for macroeconomic conditions 
and central bank policy. We also control for unobserved bank-specific time invariant 
heterogeneity and seasonal influences by adding bank and time-fixed effects.  
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9.3.1	  Banks’	  Response	  on	  Capital	  Deviations	  –	  Symmetric	  Reactions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table 5 provides the results from the regressions of growth in the total capital base (CB), Tier 
1 capital (TC), risk-weighted assets (RWA) and total assets (TA), on the capital deviation (dev) 
and a set of control variables. Deviations are negatively correlated with growth in capital and 
positively correlated with growth in assets. These findings provide support for the idea that 
banks facing a deficit relative to their target capital ratio take action to raise capital levels 
and/or reduce their risk-weighted assets. 
Looking at the two measures of capital, we see that the adjustment is somewhat larger in the 
total capital base over our estimation period. Francis and Osborne (2009a) suggest that 
adjustments in higher-quality Tier 1 capital are likely to be more costly than adjustments in 
the total capital base, based on a “pecking order” idea of capital structure. However, the 
coefficients are not statistically different on a 5 percent significance level. Norwegian banks 
do therefore not appear to favor adjustments in the less-costly total capital measure of capital.   
The third column of table 5 shows the impact of deviations from target Tier 1 ratio on the 
change in risk-weighted assets. The highly significant coefficient on the deviation suggests 
that making changes to the risk-weighted assets is an important strategy for Norwegian banks 
to revert to their target capital ratios. Changes in risk-weighted assets can be caused by a real 
change in total assets and/or altering assets among risk-weights. The last column in table 5 
provides more information on this issue. The coefficient of the deviation is statistically 
significantly lower in the regression of total assets. This result indicates that Norwegian banks 
prefer to fine-tune their risk-weighted assets by, for example, altering the composition of 
assets instead of making real changes to the size of their balance sheet when being away from 
their target capital ratio.   
Table 6 reports results from the regressions of growth in bank loans. The results provide 
evidence for a significant effect of Tier 1 deviations on growth in loans to households and 
corporate lending on 5 and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. These findings are 
consistent with the notion that banks facing a capital deficit reduce their lending, by for 
example, raising interest rates. The other coefficients of the regressions in table 5 and 6 have 
more or less the expected signs.      
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Table 5. Regressions of growth in capital and asset on capital deviations 
 Growth in: 
 
 CB TC RWA TA 
 -0.371*** -0.351*** 0.226*** 0.0799** 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒊,𝒕 (-7.21) (-7.40) (6.76) (2.69) 
     𝑮𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 0.493*** 0.320*** -0.169*** 0.192*** 
 (7.87) (6.36) (-3.60) (3.64) 
     𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑳𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 -0.162 -0.231** -0.463*** 0.269*** 
 (-1.62) (-2.94) (-6.53) (3.80) 
     𝑭𝑶𝑳𝑰𝑶𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 0.275 0.297 0.237 -0.254 
 (1.60) (1.73) (1.42) (-1.63) 
     
Constant -0.00128 0.000256 0.0193*** 0.0144*** 
 (-0.90) (0.23) (18.91) (14.30) 
N 7358 7358 7358 7358 
 
Table 6. Regressions of growth in loans on capital deviations 
 Growth in: 
 
 HLoans CLoans 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒊,𝒕 0.117** 0.167* 
 (3.26) (2.49) 
   𝑮𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 0.279*** 0.0583 
 (7.99) (0.22) 
   𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑳𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 0.0389 0.149 
 (0.75) (0.80) 
   𝑭𝑶𝑳𝑰𝑶𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 0.460*** -0.170 
 (3.99) (-0.29) 
   
Constant 0.00831*** 0.0416*** 
 (10.97) (12.38) 
N 7358 7358 
 
Notes to table 5 and 6: Table 5 displays the results from regressions of growth in the total capital base (CB), 
Tier 1 capital (TR), risk-weighted assets (RWA) and total assets (TA). Table 6 displays the results from 
regressions of growth in loans to households (HLoans) and commercial loans (Cloans). 𝑑𝑒𝑣!,! is the Tier 1 
capital deviation defined as the effective Tier 1 capital ratio minus the target ratio. The other explanatory 
variables in row 2-4 are growth in GDP, inflation rate and the folio rate, respectively. All regressions include 
bank- and time-fixed effects. Absolute t-values are presented in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level in a two-tailed t-test.  
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9.3.2	  Banks’	  Response	  to	  Capital	  Deviations	  –	  Asymmetric	  Reactions	  
The results in the previous subsection suggest that banks raise capital and/or reduce their risk-
weighted assets when deviating from their target Tier 1 ratios. However, the results do not 
take into account potential differences in the adjustment behavior between banks that are 
below or above their target. Table 7 provides results from regressions of the change in capital 
and assets where we account for potential asymmetric reactions by interacting the deviations 
from target Tier 1 ratios with a dummy variable equal one if the bank is below its target level 
and zero otherwise.   
As evident from the first two columns of table 7, banks’ response to Tier 1 deviations on 
growth in capital is significantly stronger when being below their target. The findings indicate 
that banks below their target capital ratios mostly drive the results in column 1 and 2 in table 
5. Indeed, we do not find evidence for a significant effect of capital deviations on changes in 
Tier 1 capital for banks with capital surplus. This does not mean that banks above their capital 
ratios are not interested in getting back to their targets, but indicates that they prefer other 
measures to adjust their Tier 1 ratio.  
We do not find any significant asymmetric adjustment behavior in the regressions of risk 
weighted assets and total assets. Neither do we find any difference in the adjustment behavior 
in loans of banks that are below and above their targets.     
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Table 7. Regressions of growth in capital and assets 
 Growth in: 
 CB TC RWA TA 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒊,𝒕 -0.0165* -0.0156 0.0292 0.0148 
 (-2.03) (-1.90) (1.70) (0.73) 
     𝑫𝒃𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 -0.00434* -0.00398* 0.000874 0.00291 
 (-2.38) (-2.49) (0.52) (1.77) 
     𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 ∗𝑫𝒃𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 -0.0688** -0.134*** 0.0154 0.0139 
 (-3.03) (-5.62) (0.68) (0.51) 
     𝑮𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 0.203*** 0.333*** -0.171*** 0.194*** 
 (4.43) (6.60) (-3.64) (3.66) 
     𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑳𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 -0.271*** -0.228** -0.460*** 0.268*** 
 (-3.46) (-2.92) (-6.48) (3.76) 
     𝑭𝑶𝑳𝑰𝑶𝒊,𝒕!𝟏 0.123 0.295 0.243 -0.251 
 (0.75) (1.75) (1.46) (-1.62) 
     
Constant 0.0116*** -0.00245 0.0193*** 0.0134*** 
 (7.67) (-1.96) (11.03) (6.99) 
N 7358 7358 7358 7358 
Notes: The table displays the results from regressions of growth in the total capital base (CB), Tier 1 capital 
(TR), risk weighted assets (RWA) and total assets (TA). 𝑑𝑒𝑣!,! is the Tier 1 capital deviation defined as the 
effective Tier 1 capital ratio minus the target ratio. 𝐷𝑏!,!!! is a dummy equal one for banks with a negative value 
of 𝑑𝑒𝑣!,!. 𝑑𝑒𝑣!,!!! ∗ 𝐷𝑏!,!!! is an interaction variable. The other explanatory variables in row 4-6 are growth in 
GDP, inflation rate and the folio rate, respectively. All regressions include bank- and time-fixed effects. 
Absolute t-values are presented in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level in a two-tailed t-test.  
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10.	  Summary	  and	  Concluding	  Remarks	  	  
In this thesis, we have examined the regulatory capital adjustments of Norwegian banks. In 
particular, we have tried to answer the following questions. First, what factors determine 
banks’ internal capital ratio targets? Second, how do deviations from these capital ratio targets 
influence banks’ actions in terms of adjustments in capital and asset positions?  
In order to answer the first question, a partial adjustment model of factors contributing to 
banks’ target capital ratios is developed. The model is estimated on a panel of Norwegian 
commercial and saving banks over the period 1993q1 to 2013q1. We focus on the Tier 1 
capital ratio. The results indicate that banks’ target Tier 1 capital ratios decrease with bank 
size, which is consistent with other studies in the banking literature. One important reason for 
this relationship may be that larger banks are less liquidity-constrained and have smaller costs 
in adjusting their capital ratios. Furthermore, an increase in return on equity is shown to 
increase the target capita ratio. Since the return on equity may exceed the demanded 
remuneration required by banks, we interpret this variable as a measure of revenue rather than 
cost of capital. The positive relationship therefore indicates that banks increase their capital 
levels through retained earnings when the return on equity is high. There is a systematic 
variation between banks’ target capital ratio and level of portfolio risk. Using a regulatory 
measure of portfolio risk, we find a negative effect. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that Norwegian banks have engaged in moral hazard behavior. Taken into account that most 
banks hold capital ratios above the regulatory minimum requirement, a negative relationship 
between risk and target capital ratios may indicate that risker banks hold less capital against a 
given asset-risk due to better risk-management. Moreover, an increase in banks’ own 
assessment of the losses embedded in their asset portfolio is shown to increase the target 
capital ratio.  
Norwegian banks face high costs of adjusting their capital ratios. On average, they close only 
4.1 percent of the deviation between their effective and target capital ratio each quarter. We 
therefore conclude that high cost of adjusting capital is an important explanation of why they 
hold capital ratios in excess of the regulatory minimum.   
Models of asset and capital growth are developed to assess how deviations from the target 
Tier 1 capital ratio influence banks’ actions. We find that a deviation is negatively associated 
with the growth in banks’ total capital base and Tier 1 capital, whereas it is positively 
associated with the growth in banks’ risk weighted assets and total assets. The effect of a 
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deviation on adjustments in risk-weighted assets is significantly stronger than for total assets. 
We therefore conclude that re-shuffling assets in order to increase or decrease the Tier 1 
capital ratio is an important strategy for Norwegian banks to adjust towards their target capital 
ratios. Furthermore, we find that a deviation from the Tier 1 capital ratio is positively 
correlated with the growth in loans to households and commercial loans (although, only at a 
10 percent significance level in the commercial loans regression). We also show that banks’ 
reactions to deviations are asymmetrical. In particular, we find that banks response to 
deviations on growth in both the total capital base and Tier 1 capital is significantly stronger 
when being below their target.  
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A.1	  The	  Modigliani	  and	  Miller	  Irrelevance	  Theorem	  
This appendix provides a mathematical expression of Modigliani and Miller`s irrelevance 
theorem of capital structure. We follow Vale (2011) who expresses the theorem in the 
following way: A bank is funded by equity E and debt D. The required return on equity is 𝑅! 
and the required return on debt is 𝑅!. The banks total funding costs C relative to total liability 
is: 
𝐶 = 𝑅! ∙ 𝐸 + 𝑅! ∙ 𝐷𝐷 + 𝐸  
The total funding cost C can be expressed as: 𝐶 = 𝑅! 𝑒 𝑒 + 𝑅! 𝑒 (1− 𝑒), 
by defining e as the equity ratio 𝐸/(𝐷 + 𝐸) and taking into account that 𝑅! and 𝑅! are 
decreasing in e as explained in subsection 2.1. Under MM the effect on total funding cost of 
higher equity ratio becomes: 
𝑑𝐶 = (𝑅! − 𝑅!)𝑑𝑒 + 𝜕𝑅!𝜕𝑒 ∙ 𝑒   ∙ 𝑑𝑒 + 𝜕𝑅!𝜕𝑒 (1− 𝑒)𝑑𝑒 = 0 
It follows from the discussion in subsection 2.1 that the first term is positive since equity is 
more risky than debt. Furthermore, both the second and the third term are negative since 
higher equity ratio reduces the risk of equity and debt. Under MM, the negative effects of the 
reduced debt and equity premium offset the positive effect of the increased use of the more 
expensive equity. The effect on total funding cost of higher equity ratio is zero under MM.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
